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Abstract
Cash transfers, defined as direct transfers of purchasing power from an institution or
individual to another individual, are an increasingly popular policy instrument both abroad and in
the United States. This dissertation investigates how two educational interventions utilizing cash
transfers affect participating students. The first, the Louisiana Scholarship Program, is a
statewide program offering publicly financed scholarships for low income students attending
poorly performing public schools to attend K-12 private schools. The second program, the
Arkansas Academic Challenge Scholarship, is a state financed broad-based merit-aid scholarship
for students in college within the state of Arkansas. In general, the results presented in this
dissertation suggest that students using LSP scholarships performed significantly behind their
counterparts in math and English Language Arts after one year, but did not differ substantially
from student who did not receive a scholarship on measures of non-cognitive skills or political
tolerance. In addition, the findings presented here suggest that currently enrolled students who
barely qualified for an Academic Challenge Scholarship performed no differently after one year
than students who barely missed the academic requirements, but earned significantly lower final
GPAs and were less likely to graduate within four years. These differences disappeared after five
years, suggesting that scholarship recipients may have delayed graduation in response to the
program. These studies contribute to the literature on school vouchers and college merit-aid
scholarships by providing the first experimental evaluation of a statewide voucher program on
student achievement, the first descriptive evaluation of a voucher program on student noncognitive skills and political tolerance, and the first examination of the effects of a merit-aid
scholarship on students who were currently enrolled in college at the time of scholarship receipt.

Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I would like to thank my committee members Gema Zamarro
Rodriguez, Jay P. Greene, and Patrick J. Wolf, without whose guidance and support this work
could not exist. In addition, I would like to thank my colleagues who have contributed to the
research comprising this dissertation--Albert Cheng, Collin Hitt, and Gary W. Ritter—as well as
the panel participants at the annual meetings of the Association for Education Finance and Policy
and Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management who provided valuable advice in
the research process. I am also particularly indebted to Anna Egalite and Brian Kisida, whose
advice and support played integral roles in this work as well as my development as a researcher.
In addition, I would like to thank the remaining faculty, staff, and students of the Department of
Education Reform at the University of Arkansas for contributing to my growth as a researcher
over the last few years.
I would also like to acknowledge my good friends, especially Justin Adams, Karl Doege,
and April Johnson, who have made Fayetteville feel like home for the last six years. Finally, I
would like to thank my family—Reenie and Tom Thornton, Ellie Mills, Zach Thornton, and
Laura Thornton—for their continued support during my time in Fayetteville.

Dedication
This edition of The Effectiveness of Cash Transfers as a Policy Instrument in K-16
Education is dedicated to my father, Frank Mills, whose memory I attempt to serve every day.

Table of Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
References ................................................................................................................................... 7
Chapter 1. First Year Participant Effects of the Louisiana Scholarship Program .......................... 9
Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 9
School Vouchers and K-12 Education ...................................................................................... 10
Prior Random Assignment Evaluations of School Voucher Programs ..................................... 11
Description of the Intervention ................................................................................................. 13
Research Methodology.............................................................................................................. 14
Treatment-Control Contrast ...................................................................................................... 25
Results ....................................................................................................................................... 28
Conclusion................................................................................................................................. 43
References ................................................................................................................................. 46
Appendix ................................................................................................................................... 50
Chapter 2. Measures of Non-cognitive Skills and Political Tolerance after Two Years .............. 53
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 53
Alternative outcomes and school choice ................................................................................... 54
Methodology ............................................................................................................................. 59
Results and Discussion .............................................................................................................. 67
Conclusion................................................................................................................................. 83
References ................................................................................................................................. 85
Chapter 3. Effects of the Arkansas Academic Challenge Scholarship on College Outcomes ..... 88
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 88
The Arkansas Academic Challenge Scholarship ...................................................................... 93
Method ...................................................................................................................................... 95
Results ..................................................................................................................................... 108
Discussion ............................................................................................................................... 126
References ............................................................................................................................... 130
Appendix ................................................................................................................................. 132
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 134
References ............................................................................................................................... 138

Introduction
Education is typically viewed in the United States as one of the most important means to
improve individual economic outcomes (Heckman, 2008) while also developing the nation’s
citizenry (Dewey, 1916; Gutmann, 2003). Unfortunately, despite numerous proposals to improve
the quality of education in the US, student performance has largely stagnated over the last 40
years. While 9 and 13 year olds have made significant gains on the long-term National
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), math and reading achievement has remained
stagnate for 17 year olds over the past 4 decades. Similarly, while Black and Hispanic students
have made slight gains against White students on the NAEP since 1970, achievement gaps
persist today. At the same time, real current dollar expenditure per pupil has more than doubled
since the 1970s (Mills, 2013). In addition, while America’s higher education system is generally
viewed as having played an important role in the nation’s economic success (Goldin & Katz,
2008), college graduation rates have risen only slightly since 2004 (National Center for
Education Statistics, 2014). This dissertation presents an investigation of two educational
interventions—one focused on K-12 education and the other on higher education—utilizing cash
transfers, defined as a direct transfer of purchasing power from an institution or individual to
another individual, to address these issues in the K-16 education system.
Cash transfer programs have become a popular education policy instrument in developing
nations (Baird, Ferreira, Ozler, & Woolcock, 2013; Baird, McIntosh, & Ozler, 2011; Handa &
Davis, 2006; World Bank, 2009). Cash transfers can be implemented in two types: unconditional
and conditional cash transfers. While conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs build in rules for
program eligibility as well as continual receipt of funds, unconditional cash transfer (UCT)
programs typically do not have such on-going requirements (Baird et al., 2013). In general,
1

studies of CCT and UCT interventions in developing nations using the most rigorous empirical
methods available generally find positive effects on schooling outcomes. Baird et al. (2013)
provide a meta-analysis of the effects of CCTs and UCTs on schooling and later life outcomes in
developing nations. Their work reviews evidence from 35 experimental and quasi-experimental
evaluations of cash transfer programs, with five focused exclusively on UCTs, 26 on CCTs, and
four studies comparing the two types of interventions to one another. In general, Baird et al.
report that UCTs and CCTs significantly improve the likelihood of enrolling in and attending
school. Moreover, the authors report evidence suggesting that stronger conditions are generally
correlated with stronger effects among CCT programs.
Nevertheless, there is evidence suggestive of some tradeoffs between CCTs and UCTs.
Baird, McIntosh, and Ozler (2011) note that CCT proponents argue that conditions are needed in
cash transfer programs to address existing market failures that led to the under investment in
education in the first place. This argument is supported by empirical evidence suggesting
relatively stronger effects associated with CCTs over UCTs (Baird, McIntosh, & Ozler, 2011;
Baird et al., 2013; Todd & Wolpin, 2006). In addition, CCT proponents suggest that conditions
are necessary in order to gain political support from the middle- and upper-classes (Baird,
McIntosh, & Ozler, 2011). Proponents, on the other hand, argue that UCTs should serve as the
default because policy designers actually have a poor understanding of how incentives operate in
CCTs (Baird, McIntosh, & Ozler, 2011). For example, Baird, McIntosh, and Ozler (2011) find
that teen pregnancy and marriage rates were significantly lower among girls randomly assigned
to a UCT-style intervention in Malawi compared to girls assigned to a CCT intervention. In
addition, Benhassine, Devoto, Duflo, Dupas, and Pouliquen (2013) find that simple
informational nudges may be all that is required, as individuals in Morocco randomly assigned to
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an UCT intervention that was explicitly identified as an educational intervention were no less
likely enroll in school as students assigned to a CCT program. Thus, while evidence from
developing nations indicates that cash transfers generally can positively affect schooling
outcomes, there is evidence that program design can have important—and potentially
unintended—consequences for program effectiveness.
Cash transfers are also becoming an increasingly popular policy instrument in K-12 and
higher education in the United States. Cash transfers have long played a prominent role in higher
education policy in the U.S. (Dynarski, 2004). Examples include Pell Grants and the G.I. Bill at
the federal level, state financed merit-aid scholarships such as the Georgia HOPE scholarship
and the West Virginia PROMISE scholarship at the state level, and privately financed
scholarships offered directly by institutions. In addition, school vouchers, or publicly financed
scholarships for K-12 students to attend private schools (Wolf, 2008), have recently begun to
take on a more prominent role in K-12 education policy. Motivated by low achievement,
especially among the relatively poor, several cities and states have implemented voucher
programs in the hopes of improving student achievement by allowing for better matches of
students to schools as well as improving the general quality of K-12 education systems by
introducing competitive forces into an otherwise monopolistic system. As of 2013, 12 states and
the District of Columbia have implemented school voucher programs (The Friedman Foundation
for Educational Choice, 2013). In all cases, the vouchers are conditional cash transfers, with
program eligibility determined by a number of requirements such as low family income or
evidence of a disability (The Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice, 2013).
This dissertation provides an investigation into the effects of two statewide conditional
cash-transfer based educational interventions on participating students. The first program, the
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Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP), is a school voucher program offering publicly financed
scholarships to low-income children in poorly performing public schools to attend K-12 private
schools. The second program, the Arkansas Academic Challenge Scholarship (ACS), offers
sizable college scholarships to incoming freshman and currently enrolled college students who
have met a series of academic-based eligibility requirements. Both interventions fall under the
broad category of conditional cash transfer programs because of their incoming and continuing
eligibility requirements.1
The following pages provide rigorous investigations into the effects of these programs on
student outcomes. Chapters 1 and 2 first investigate the experiences of eligible students applying
to the Louisiana Scholarship Program in the first year of the statewide expansion of the program.
Chapter 1 employs an experimental design to estimate the impact of LSP usage on student
achievement on Louisiana's state assessments after one year. In contrast with prior experimental
studies of K-12 school voucher programs in the U.S. which have largely found null or positive
effects, the results presented in Chapter 1 suggest significant negative impacts for students
induced to use the scholarship to attend private schools. Chapter 2 compliments Chapter 1 by
providing a descriptive comparison of the development of non-cognitive skills2 and levels of
political tolerance among the first cohort of students in the statewide expansion of the LSP.
Utilizing results from phone surveys administered to a subsample of eligible LSP applicants, we

1

LSP is a conditional cash transfer program due to its eligibility requirements and because
continued receipt is made conditional on enrollment in the private school. Currently enrolled
college students were eligible for the ACS if they had been continually enrolled in up to 12 credit
hours per semester since their initial matriculation and had a cumulative GPA of 2.5. ACS
recipients would continue to receive an ACS scholarship if they successfully completed 15 credit
hours a semester and maintained a cumulative GPA of 2.5.
2
Non-cognitive skills has become a catch all phrase commonly used among economists to
describe non-academic outcomes (West et al., 2014). Chapter 2 focuses on the non-cognitive
skills of Grit (Duckworth, Peterson, Matthews, & Kelly, 2007), Locus of Control (Rotter, 1966),
and Self-esteem (Rosenburg, 1965).
4

find no evidence of significant differences between students who received an LSP scholarship
and those who did not receive a scholarship on any of the scales examined.
Chapter 3 provides a quasi-experimental analysis of the effects of the ACS on short- and
long-run college outcomes among students who were enrolled at a Large Arkansas University
(LAU) during a dramatic expansion of the program in the fall of 2010. In particular, we take
advantage of detailed panel data on students along with knowledge of the ACS eligibility
requirements to compare the outcomes of students who barely qualified for the scholarship with
those of students who just missed the eligibility requirements in a fuzzy regression discontinuity
design. In general, while the analyses presented in Chapter 3 admittedly suffer from concerns
regarding statistical power, our models indicate that ACS receipt did not affect student outcomes
in the short-run but did have significant negative effects on final GPA as well as the likelihood of
graduating within four years. Nevertheless, our results also suggest that ACS recipients
eventually caught up to their counterparts, as we find no evidence of significant differences in
the likelihood of graduation after five years.
The evidence presented in this dissertation benefits the literatures on school vouchers,
state financed higher education scholarships, and cash transfers more generally in several ways.
First, Chapter 1 provides the first experimental analysis of a statewide K-12 voucher program in
the U.S. In doing so, this analysis offers insight into how school voucher programs may affect
student achievement when brought to scale. With an increasing number of states implementing
such large-scale programs, this research is particularly timely.
Chapter 2 additionally benefits the school voucher literature by providing the first
examination of the distribution of non-cognitive skills associated with a school voucher program.
While a growing body of research demonstrates the importance of such skills for later life
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success (Almlund et al. 2011; Heckman & Kautz, 2012; Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004),
evaluations of school voucher programs have generally restricted themselves to measures of
student achievement, attainment, and satisfaction. While our results indicate no evidence of
significant differences between the students receiving and not receiving an LSP scholarship, this
work nevertheless expands the school voucher literature by providing a first attempt at
examining the distribution of such skills among participating students.
Finally, Chapter 3 benefits the literature on state financed scholarships in two ways. First,
Chapter 3 compliments exiting research by focusing on a program with relatively low eligibility
requirements. Second, by focusing on students who were currently enrolled in college at the time
of the program's expansion, as opposed to incoming Freshman, our study represents the first
attempt to estimate the motivational effects of a merit-aid scholarship on student outcomes that is
unaffected by any motivational effects occurring prior to enrollment in college.3
Taken together, the research presented in the following chapters represents important
contributions to the understanding regarding the effectiveness of cash transfers as policy
instruments in K-12 education.

3

For example, the mere existence of merit-aid scholarships may incentivize students to work
harder in high school to meet the program eligibility requirements (Dynarski, 2004).
6

References
Almlund, M., Duckworth, A. L., Heckman, J. J., & Kautz, T. (2011). Personality psychology and
economics (NBER Working Paper No. 16822). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Baird, S., Ferreira, F. H. G., Ozler, B., & Woolcock, M. (2013). Relative effectiveness of
conditional and unconditional cash transfers for schooling outcomes in developing
countries: A systematic review. Campbell Systematic Reviews, 8.
Baird, S., McIntosh, C., & Ozler, B. (2011). Cash or condition? Evidence from a cash transfer
experiment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126, 1709–1753.
Benhassine, N., Devoto, F., Duflo, E., Dupas, P., & Pouliquen, V. (2013). Turning a shove into a
nudge? A “Labeled Cash Transfer” for education (NBER Working Paper No. 19227).
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Dewey, J. (1916). Democracy and education. New York, NY: The Macmillian Company.
Dynarski, S. (2004). The new merit aid. In Hoxby, C. M. (Ed.), College Choices: The Economics
of Where to Go, When to Go, and How to Pay for It. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press.
Goldin, C., & Katz, L. F. (2008). The race between education and technology. Cambridge, MA:
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Gutmann, A. (2003). Assessing arguments for school choice: Pluralism, parental rights, or
educational results? In A. Wolfe (Ed.), School Choice: The Moral Debate (pp. 126–148).
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Handa, S., & Davis, B. (2006). The experience of conditional cash transfers in Latin America
and the Caribbean. Development Policy Review, 24(5), 513–536.
Heckman, J. J. (2008). Schools, skills, and synapses. Economic Inquiry, 46(3).
Mills, J. N. (2013b). The achievement impacts of Arkansas open-enrollment charter schools.
Journal of Education Finance, 38(4), 320–342.
National Center for Education Statistics. (2014). Digest of education statistics (Table 326.10.).
National Center for Education Statistics, Institute of Education Sciences, U.S.
Department of Education. Washington, DC. Retrieved from
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d13/tables/dt13_326.10.asp
Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and the adolescent self-image. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Rotter, J. R. (1966). Generalized expectations for internal versus external control of
reinforcement. Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, 80(1), 1–28.
7

Tangney, J. P., Baumeister, R. F., & Boone, A. L. (2004). High self-control predicts good
adjustment, less pathology, better grades, and interpersonal success. Journal of
Personality, 72(2), 271–322.
The Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice (2013). The ABCs of school choice, 2013
edition. Indianapolis, IN: The Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice.
Todd, P. E., & Wolpin, K. I. (2006). Assessing the impact of a school subsidy program in
Mexico: using a social experiment to validate a dynamic behavioral model of child
schooling and fertility. American Economic Review, 96, 1384–1417.
Turner, S. E. (2004). Going to college and finishing college: Explaining different educational
outcomes. In College Choices: The Economics of Where to Go, When to Go, and How to
Pay for It (pp. 13–62). Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
West, M. R., Gabrieli, C. F. O., Finn, A. S., Kraft, M. K., & Gabrieli, J. D. E. (2014). What
effective schools do. Education Next, 14(4).
Wolf, P. J. (2008). Vouchers. The International Encyclopedia of Education (McCulloch, G., &
Crook, D., eds.). London: Routledge, pp. 635-636.
World Bank. (2009). Conditional cash transfers: Reducing present and future poverty.
Washington, DC: World Bank.

8

Chapter 14
First Year Participant Effects of the Louisiana Scholarship Program

Introduction
The Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP) is a statewide school voucher program,
providing public funds for low-income students in underperforming public schools to attend
participating private schools.5 Originally piloted in New Orleans in 2008, the statewide
expansion of the LSP program in 2012-13 allowed almost 5,000 low- to moderate-income
students across the state of Louisiana to transfer out of their traditional public schools and into
private schools at state expense. The empirical evidence presented here examines how the LSP
has impacted student achievement in the first year of the statewide expansion.
Our analysis uses the results of the oversubscription lotteries for nearly 10,000 eligible
applicants to analyze the achievement impacts of LSP as a randomized control trial (RCT). In
particular, we estimate the effect of using an LSP scholarship to enroll in a private school for
applicants to oversubscribed lotteries who were induced to attend a private school as a result of
winning the lottery. Our analysis uses student-level data obtained via a data-sharing agreement
with the state of Louisiana.
In general the results presented in this chapter indicate that the use of an LSP scholarship
to enroll in private schools is associated with statistically significant—and substantively large—
negative effects on student achievement. Specifically, LSP users are found to be nearly a quarter
of a standard deviation behind their control group counterparts in English Language Arts and

4
5

This paper was co-authored with Patrick J. Wolf and Jay P. Greene.
The program was initially called the Student Scholarships for Educational Excellence Program
but is now referred to as the Louisiana Scholarship Program.
9

two-thirds of a standard deviation behind in math. The magnitude of these negative estimates is
unprecedented in the literature of random assignment evaluations of school voucher programs.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, we define terms
that are key to our analysis. Then we summarize the existing literature on random assignment
evaluations of the participant effects of school voucher programs. After that, we provide a brief
description of the LSP and the lottery process that enabled the experimental analysis. Next we
describe the data and analytical strategy used to estimate the participant effects of the first year
of the statewide expansion of the LSP. We then describe the results of our analyses and conclude
with a discussion of our findings.
School Vouchers and K-12 Education
School vouchers are a mechanism by which government resources are provided to
families that enable them to attend a private school of their choosing (Wolf, 2008). Strictly
speaking, a private school choice program is only a “voucher” program if the government funds
the program directly out of an appropriation. Other private school choice programs are funded
indirectly, through tax credits provided to businesses or individuals who contribute to nonprofit
scholarship-granting organizations. Such arrangements are commonly called tax-credit
scholarship programs. Since tax-credit scholarship programs accomplish the same general
purpose as voucher programs we will treat both types of private school choice programs as
functionally equivalent for purposes of this study, although we will specify whether individual
initiatives are voucher or tax-credit scholarship programs when discussing them.
Although the origin of the voucher idea generally is linked to economist Milton Friedman
(1955), political philosophers Thomas Paine (1791) and John Stuart Mill (1962 [1869])
supported the theoretical debate about their desirability. It would seem that high-quality research
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on the question is an imperative (Doolittle & Connors, 2001). For example, Richard Murnane
(2005) argues:
Providing families who lack resources with educational choices makes sense. The
consequences of attempting to do this through a large-scale voucher…system are
unknown. Carefully designed experiments could provide critical knowledge. (p.
181)
Experimental design is critical in the case of evaluating school voucher programs because
of concerns about selection bias due to more motivated and able families self-sorting into private
schools on their own or through access to a voucher. Fortunately, much of the research on school
vouchers in the U.S. has taken the form of random assignment experiments.
Prior Random Assignment Evaluations of School Voucher Programs
Prior rigorous empirical studies of the effects of school vouchers on participants’
achievement, though generally modestly positive, have been inconsistent in their pattern of
results and have yet to produce a scholarly consensus about the impacts of vouchers on students’
academic outcomes (Wolf, 2008; Barrow & Rouse, 2008).
A total of 13 analyses have applied experimental or regression discontinuity design
(RDD) methods to data from voucher and voucher-type scholarship programs in Charlotte,
Dayton, the District of Columbia, Florida, Milwaukee, and New York to determine their impacts
on student achievement. Both analyses of the Charlotte data reported that the scholarship
program produced positive and statistically significant achievement impacts (Greene, 2001;
Cowen, 2008). The experimental evaluation of the Dayton scholarship program concluded that it
produced achievement gains, but only for the African American subgroup of participants
(Howell et al., 2002). A single analysis of experimental data from an early scholarship program
in the District of Columbia concluded that achievement gains from the program that were evident
after two years disappeared in the third and final year of the evaluation (Howell & Peterson,
11

2006). The congressionally mandated evaluation of the District of Columbia Opportunity
Scholarship (voucher) Program, established in 2004, reported achievement impacts, but only in
reading, that were statistically significant at a 99 percent level of significance after three years
(Wolf et al. 2009, p. 36) but only at a 94 percent level of significance in the fourth and final year
of the study (Wolf et al. 2013; Wolf et al. 2010, p. 35). An RDD analysis of the tax-credit
scholarship program in Florida concluded that students near the income eligibility cutoff
experienced clear achievement gains in reading, but not necessarily in math, if they had access to
the program (Figlio, 2011).
Two different analyses of experimental data from the early years of the Milwaukee
voucher program reached slightly different conclusions, with one reporting that voucher students
realized statistically significant achievement gains in both reading and math (Greene, Peterson,
& Du, 1999) and the other stating that the voucher achievement gains were limited to just math
(Rouse, 1998). Five different analyses of data from the New York scholarship experiment also
reached somewhat divergent conclusions. One study reported no significant achievement gains
from the scholarship program, overall or for any subgroup of participants (Krueger & Zhu,
2004). Two other analyses employing alternative methods for addressing missing data found
program-induced gains, but only for African Americans in math (Barnard, Frangakis, Hill, &
Rubin, 2003; Jin, Barnard, & Rubin, 2010). The original experimental analysis concluded that
African American scholarship students outperformed the control group students on a combined
measure of math and reading scores (Mayer et al., 2002).6 Finally, Bitler, Domina, Penner, and

Nevertheless, as Peterson and Howell (2004) note, Krueger and Zhu’s insignificant subgroup
findings appear to be driven in part by the particularly unique way in which they chose to
classify students as African American.
6
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Hoynes (2013) examine using quantile analysis if effects differed across the achievement
distribution, finding little evidence of heterogeneous effects.
Since the pattern of results from previous experimental and RDD evaluations of voucher
programs has ranged from neutral to positive, with no statistically significant negative impacts of
vouchers on student achievement having been reported to date, our operating hypothesis is that
the LSP will have a positive impact on student achievement.
Description of the Intervention
The Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP) is a statewide school voucher program
available to moderate- to low-income students in low-performing public schools across the state
of Louisiana. Student eligibility for the scholarship program is determined by family income—
which must not exceed 250 percent of the federal poverty line—and where the student previously
attended public school. Income-eligible students must have attended a public school that was
graded C, D, or F for the prior school year; be entering kindergarten; or have been previously
enrolled in the Recovery School District in order to be fully eligible for the program. In the
program’s first year, 9,809 students were deemed to be fully eligible applicants, with a majority
of them located outside of Orleans parish.
The LSP was created by Act 2 of the 2012 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature
and Senate. Act 2 requires the state board to allocate the funds for the program annually from the
minimum foundation program. The voucher size is the lesser of the amount allocated to the local
school system in which the student resides or the tuition charged by the participating private
school that the student attends. Average tuition at participating private schools ranges from
$2,966 to $8,999, with a median cost of $4,925, compared to an average total minimum
foundation program per pupil amount of $8,500 for public schools.
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Private schools that wish to participate in the program must go through a screening
process and schools that do not meet the required participation criteria are declared ineligible to
participate in the program. There are four areas that are evaluated for determining school
eligibility: (1) enrollment; (2) financial practice; (3) student mobility; and (4) health, safety and
welfare of students. In the 2012-13 school year, only a third of eligible private schools
participated in the program (Kisida, Wolf, & Rhinesmith, 2013). A recent survey of participating
and non-participating private schools in Louisiana suggests that the program’s regulatory barriers
have strongly influenced schools’ choices to participate (Kisida, Wolf, & Rhinesmith, 2013).
Research Methodology
Experimental Design
When the LSP was expanded to a statewide program in 2012, the Louisiana Department
of Education also changed the lottery process determining scholarship awards. While the original
application process in the New Orleans pilot version of the LSP allowed families to submit the
name of only one private school for admission, the revised application process allowed
individuals to offer up to five private school preferences. This difference was the result of
switching to a lottery process similar to the deferred acceptance lotteries used in New York City
to assign students to schools through the city’s public school choice program (see
Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, & Roth, 2005). The deferred acceptance algorithm is designed to
encourage families to reveal their true school preference rankings and thereby reduce the
likelihood of gaming.
While it is not the case that all eligible LSP applicants were awarded scholarships
through a lottery process in the 2012-13 school year, we can isolate cases in which lotteries
occurred in order to perform an experimental evaluation of the program.
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Specifically, eligible LSP applicants were allowed to submit up to five private school
preferences and the LSP lottery algorithm attempted to place students into schools while taking
into account several lottery priorities. First, students with disabilities and “multiple birth
siblings”7 are manually awarded LSP scholarships if there is available space at their given school
preference. Remaining students are grouped into one of six priority categories:


Priority 1 - Students who received LSP scholarships in the prior school year who are
applying to the same school



Priority 2 - Siblings of Priority 1 awardees in the current round



Priority 3 - Students who received LSP scholarships in the prior school year who are
applying to a different school



Priority 4 – New applicants who attended public schools that received a “D” or “F”
grade in Louisiana’s school accountability system at baseline



Priority 5 – New applicants who attended public schools that received a “C” grade in
Louisiana’s school accountability system at baseline



Priority 6 – New applicants who are applying for kindergarten placements
The LSP award process is summarized in Figure 1. The process begins by attempting to

place all Priority 1 category students into their first choice school. The algorithm first groups
Priority 1 students applying to the same school and grade combination and then checks the
number of available seats for that grouping. If there are more seats than applicants, all students
receive an LSP scholarship. If there are no seats available, no students in the given group receive
a scholarship. Finally, if there are more applicants than seats, students are awarded LSP

7

“Multiple birth siblings” are twins, triplets, etc.
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scholarships through a lottery. Once the process is complete for all Priority 1 students, the
algorithm attempts to place Priority 2 students into their first choice school. After cycling
through all remaining priority categories, the LSP algorithm attempts to place students who have
yet to receive a scholarship in their second choice schools. The LSP algorithm continues until all
eligible applicants have either been awarded or not awarded an LSP scholarship.
First school
choice
P1

Second school
choice
Third school
choice

P2

No seats

Applicants > Seats

Applicants < Seats

P3
Lottery

Awardees

P4
Fourth school
choice
Fifth school
choice

P5
P6

Non-awardees
Proceed to next school preference/choice round
after all priority levels have gone through current
process

End of lottery for current priority level

End of lottery for all priority levels

Non-awardees at the end of this process do not get placed

Figure 1. The Louisiana Scholarship Program award allocation process for the 2012-13 school
year. This figure illustrates the iterative process used to allocate LSP scholarships to students. In
addition, this figure highlights the fact that only a subset of students was awarded LSP
scholarships via lotteries. Our analysis focuses on isolating lotteries for one’s first choice school.
It is important to note that only a subset of eligible applicants were awarded or not
awarded an LSP scholarship via a lottery process. Specifically, only those students in priority
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categories one through six whose school-grade combination had more applicants than available
seats participated in a lottery. Fortunately, using data on student characteristics and school
preferences, we can identify the subset of eligible applicants who experienced a lottery process. 8
We will focus on this subset of lottery participants to estimate the effects of the LSP on student
achievement after one year of program participation because these are the only applicants for
whom LSP scholarship award was randomly determined.9
Data Description
Most of the data for this study come from student-level datasets provided by the
Louisiana Department of Education (LDE) in compliance with our data agreement with the state.
The LDE had provided us with their:


Student Information Systems (SIS) files for 2011-12 (“Baseline”) and 2012-13 (“Year 1
Outcome”) which includes data on student enrollment and demographic background;



LSP eligible applicant file, which includes information on the school choice sets of all
eligible applicants as well as the results of the 2011-12 placement lottery;



State assessment files for the 2011-12 and 2012-13 school years, which include data on
each student’s participation in the annual accountability assessments and their scores.
The LDE also provided information on participating public and private schools, and this

information is supplemented with publicly available data from the National Center for Education

8

We infer that a lottery has occurred when the LSP award percentage is between 0 and 100
percent for a given school preference by grade by priority category combination. For example, if
60 percent of Priority 1 category students applying to third grade at school “A” as their first
choice school actually received scholarships, we assume that all students in that combination
were subject to a lottery.
9
After accounting for student testing, demographic, and school data while also limiting our
analysis to students in binding lotteries, approximately 7 percent of the analytical sample were in
Priority Category 1, less than 1 percent were in Priority Category 3, 74 percent were in Priority
Category 4, and 18 percent were in Priority Category 5. Priority Category 2 is not represented in
our analysis.
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Statistics (NCES) Common Core of Data (CCD) and Private School Universe Survey (PSS)
when necessary.
The Louisiana state accountability system places a strong emphasis on test-based
accountability, with standardized assessments offered in most grades—including alternative
assessments, end-of-course exams, and exams measuring college-readiness. The participant
effects portion of this study uses student performance on the Louisiana state assessments in
grades three through eight as our primary outcome measure of interest.10 All students
participating in the LSP are required to be tested by their private schools, using the state
accountability assessments, for any grade in which the public school system also tests its
students.
Students in Louisiana who are not classified as having a special need that qualifies them
for alternative programs take one of two state assessments in grades three through eight. In
grades four and eight, students take the Louisiana Educational Assessment Program (LEAP)
exams, a series of criterion-referenced tests aligned with Louisiana’s state standards for the
subjects of math, English language arts, science, and social studies. In the remaining grades,
students take the Integrated Louisiana Educational Assessment Program (iLEAP) exams, a series
of hybrid exams including both criterion-referenced and norm-referenced test items in the same
subjects as the LEAP exams. Performance on both sets of exams ranges between a minimum
possible score of 100 and a maximum possible score of 500. All exams are scaled with means of

10

Our initial investigations of the test databases revealed 391 eligible LSP applicants in tested
grades with missing testing data at baseline and 516 observations in year 1. These observations
represent approximately 10 and 15 percent of the eligible LSP applicants in relevant grade ranges
for these years. Further investigation revealed that 82 of the missing observations took the
Louisiana alternative assessments at baseline and 115 took them in year 1. Given our
requirements for baseline equivalence, all records with missing baseline testing data are excluded
from our analysis.
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300 and standard deviations of 50 (Louisiana Department of Education, 2013a; 2013b). Rather
than rely on these scale score values, which differ across grades by design, our analysis is
primarily based on standardized values of individual LEAP and iLEAP performance.11 While the
LEAP and iLEAP item differences introduce noise into our model, the fact that both treatment
and control students in a particular grade take the same exam (either LEAP or iLEAP), and our
inclusion of prior achievement on the right-hand side of the model, should reduce the likelihood
of bias due to these test differences.
There are a small number of eligible LSP applicants with duplicate records in the baseline
(12 duplicate pairs) and year 1 testing data (42 duplicate pairs). When possible, we have resolved
duplicates by keeping records with the most complete data on LSP participants. For the
remaining observations, we have randomly kept one record and dropped the other. These records
represent less than 1 percent of the LSP applicants in both years.
In addition to individual performance outcomes, the state-provided assessment data files
include information on student demographics as well as participation in school programs such as
the free- and reduced-price lunch (FRL) program and special education program enrollments.
Our analysis includes these baseline covariates in order to improve effect estimate precision.12
Sample Selection Process
The student-level data provided by the LDE indicate an initial sample of 9,809 eligible
LSP applicants in the first year of the statewide expansion of the program. Of these, 5,777

11

Values have been standardized within grade and year based on the observed means and
standard deviations for control group members on the ELA and math portions of the iLEAP and
LEAP.
12
A single individual in our final analysis sample has missing data for their gender status as
baseline (2011-12). We have updated this individual’s gender status using their reported gender
in the 2012-13 assessment data. After making this substitution, all records in our final analysis
sample have complete information on baseline covariates.
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students received LSP scholarship placements in a specific private school and 4,038 did not
receive a voucher-supported placement. Our analysis relies on a non-random sample of this
original population comprised of eligible applicants with baseline testing data in grades three
through seven who did not list a special education exclusion on their application and who were
not multiple birth siblings. Of the 2,897 observations meeting these criteria, we identify 1,908
individuals as participating in LSP scholarship lotteries. Of these, 727—or 38 percent—won LSP
scholarships.
Analytical Strategy
This section outlines the empirical strategy we use to estimate the impacts of LSP
scholarship usage on student achievement after two years. We begin with a description of our
primary analyses, which use the results of eligible applicants’ first school choice lotteries to
estimate the impact of LSP scholarship usage on student achievement in a two-stage least
squares (2SLS) framework. We then outline a series of subgroup analyses conducted to examine
possible effect heterogeneity of the LSP scholarship program.
Local Average Treatment Effect estimation. As Bloom and Unterman (2014) note,
because students can participate in multiple lotteries in a deferred-acceptance award process, the
traditional intent-to-treat estimator has limited policy relevance.13 Instead, we intend to estimate
the impact of LSP scholarship usage on student achievement—also known as the Local Average
Treatment Effect (LATE) (Angrist & Pischke, 2009, Cowen, 2008)—by using the result of one’s
first choice school lottery as an instrumental variable to predict scholarship usage in a 2SLS
framework. The lottery is the ideal instrumental variable as the high placement take-up rate for
this program ensures that it is will be a strong predictor of private schooling while the random

13

For example, a student who loses her first lottery can still win an LSP scholarship to her
second choice school via lottery.
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nature of the lottery process assures that scholarship receipt is uncorrelated with the error term.
In addition, because students could only receive a chance to use an LSP scholarship to enroll in a
private school through the lottery, we can be confident that the variable only influences student
outcomes through the private schooling that it enables.
Specifically, we use the following 2SLS model to estimate the effects of LSP scholarship
usage on student achievement after two years:
1.

𝐸𝑖 = ∑𝜋𝑗 𝑅𝑗𝑖 + 𝛿𝑇𝑖 + 𝑿𝜷 + 𝑢𝑖

2.

𝑌𝑖 = ∑𝛼𝑗 𝑅𝑗𝑖 + 𝜏𝐸̂𝑖 + 𝑿_𝒊𝜸 + 𝜖𝑖

Where i denotes student and j denotes lottery:
 E is a variable indicating the number of years a student used an LSP to enroll in a private
school14


R_i is a fixed effect for a student’s first choice school lottery15



T_i is a variable indicating if a student received an LSP scholarship to their first choice
school



Y_i is student standardized math or English Language Arts achievement in year 1 of the
program (2012-13)16

Although some prior studies have used “ever attended private school” (Wolf et al., 2010,
Appendix D) or “consistently enrolled in private school” (Mayer et al., 2002) as the endogenous
treatment “dosage” variable instrumented for, we follow the approach used by Rouse (1998) and
employ the lottery to instrument for total years of private schooling as a more global and precise
treatment dosage measure.
15
We include a fixed effect for first school choice lottery to account for differing probabilities of
success across lotteries (Gerber & Green, 2012). By using fixed effects, we are essentially
comparing lottery winners and losers within the same strata to calculate unbiased estimates of the
effect of being randomly offered an LSP scholarship. The approach is comparable to analyzing
the impact of hundreds of “mini-experiments” and aggregating the results across them.
16
Student achievement scores are standardized using distributional parameters of outcomes from
the control group.
14
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X_i is a vector of student characteristics—including achievement—collected at baseline
(2011-12)
The 2SLS procedure first uses one’s treatment status to predict the number of years they

will actually use a scholarship; and then uses this predicted value to provide an unbiased LATE
effect estimate (𝜏̂ ) for the program. It is important to note that the proposed method instruments
for LSP usage using the result of one’s first choice school lottery outcome (T). This implies that
the 2SLS procedure will effectively treat students who lose their first choice lottery but go on to
win an LSP to a lower school preference as control-group cross overs (Bloom & Unterman,
2014).
In addition, it is important to note that there are at least two types of nesting in the LSP
data that can lead to biased inference (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). First, members of both the
treatment and control group are nested within schools in the first year of the program analysis.
Second, observations can be nested within family units, with the potential for several children
participating from the same family.17 This was also the case in the evaluation of the Opportunity
Scholarship Program (OSP) in Washington, DC, in which researchers used standard errors
clustered at the family level to account for error-covariance (Wolf et al., 2013). Unfortunately,
the results presented here do not account for these types of nesting due to the complex nature of
multi-level clustering. Instead, we currently only account for nesting of observations within risk
set.18 We intend to address this issue in future versions of this research.
Given our dataset, there are two broad methods available to account for non-response
bias: employing non-response weights or making assumptions about the nature of non-response

17

Approximately 23 percent of individuals in our final analytical sample have siblings that also
appear in the sample.
18
Clustering on risk set should capture a large amount of the nesting of individuals within
current school as risk set includes school of application.
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to estimate bounds around the program’s true effect (Gerber & Green, 2012). Nonresponse
weights effectively reweight the data to allow respondent values to account for the values of nonrespondents (Kreuter & Valliant, 2007). Nevertheless, it is important to note that nonresponse
weights do not account for potential unobservable forces that may be driving patterns of
nonresponse. If, for example, those in the control group with higher expected outcomes both in
public and private school leave the sample with higher probability, our LATE estimates will be
positively biased. Given the likelihood that the observed control non-response reflects potential
selection effects, we prefer instead to estimate the degree to which attrition affects our estimates
via a bounding exercise (Angrist, Bettinger, Kremer, 2006; Lee, 2009). Specifically, if we
assume that the causes of missing data are monotonic19, we can estimate an upper and lower
bound for the LSP effect by omitting a portion of the control group from the data in order to
balance non-response probabilities among treated and controls. While our primary estimates of
the effects of LSP scholarship usage on student achievement after one year do not account for
differential attrition, we include as a robustness check estimates based on the bounding exercises.
In general, the results from our bounding analyses do not suggest that differential attrition has
strongly influenced our primary LATE estimates.
Subgroup analysis. In addition to examining overall program impacts, we examine the
extent to which LSP program effects differ across different subgroups. In particular, we examine
if there are differential impacts experienced for three subgroups: (1) males relative to females,
(2) African American participants compared to all other program participants, and (3) New

19

The monotonicity assumption requires that treatment assignment influences data missingness
in one unique direction (Gerber & Green, 2012). This assumption seems plausible in our case, as
we are most concerned with sample attrition resulting from control group students attending
private schools on their own accord and it is highly unlikely that a student who won a
scholarship to their first choice school chose to attend an alternative private school.
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Orleans participants compared to other participants. The first two subgroup analyses are
motivated by prior evaluations of school choice programs, which have found differential effects
by gender and ethnicity groups.20 The final subgroup comparison is motivated by the strong
existing market for school choice in New Orleans in comparison with the rest of the state. In
addition to having a pilot version of the LSP in place since 2008, New Orleans has a thriving
charter school market and a history of public school choice (Cowen Institute, 2013). As such, it
is highly likely the experiences of LSP participants in New Orleans are substantially different
than other participants; and we should therefore examine the extent to which these differences
translate into our estimated program effects.
Finally, in addition to the subgroup analyses described, we examine if there are
heterogeneous treatment effects by baseline achievement category. Unfortunately, we are unable
to use the same analytical strategy to estimate performance subgroup effects using the interaction
models outlined above while also controlling for baseline achievement. Instead, we run our
primary regression models on three separate subgroups of students: those in the bottom third of
the baseline achievement distribution, those in the middle third, and those in the top third. While
this method does not allow for a statistical test of the differences between the estimated treatment
effects across the three models, it does provide descriptive insight into the extent to which
students in different parts of the achievement distribution experienced the program differently.21

20

Analyses of the New York Scholarship Program have found significant effects for African
Americans, but insignificant effect estimates overall (Mayer et al., 2002; Barnard et al., 2003;
Chingos & Peterson, 2013). Similarly, Wolf and colleagues (2013) report significant
improvement in reading for female participants in the DC OSP evaluation, but no significant
differences for males.
21
Bitler and colleagues (2013) focus on differences in treatment effects across the achievement
distribution associated with the New York City School Choice Scholarships Program. The results
of their quantile treatment effects analysis provide limited evidence of heterogeneous effects.
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Treatment-Control Contrast
Before moving on to our primary analyses, we examine two features of the data that have
implications for our analysis. First, we examine the extent to which treatment assignment is
correlated with school enrollment by looking at school enrollments for lottery winners and
losers. Next, we examine the extent to which the lottery process resulted in covariate balance at
baseline for our analysis sample.
Scholarship Usage
While eligible applicants were randomly assigned to receive or not receive an LSP
scholarship with private school placement, participating families are not required to use the
scholarship to attend their designated school. Lottery winners, for example, could choose to
attend traditional public schools or charter schools rather than use their scholarship offer to
attend the private school in which they were placed by the lottery. Lottery losers, on the other
hand, could choose to attend charter schools or elect to enroll in private schools without a
scholarship in addition to attending a traditional public school.
Table 1 describes the patterns of enrollment for students who received and did not receive
LSP scholarships to their first choice schools in the first year of the analysis. It should be noted
that, because our LATE analysis focuses on the results of first choice school lotteries, the control
group includes both students who were never awarded a scholarship and students who received a
scholarship to one of their remaining school preferences. The latter group, who account for the
60 control group members appearing in private schools in 2012-13, are effectively treated as
control-group crossovers in our LATE analysis.
The results in Table 1 indicate that the majority of lottery winners used their scholarships
to attend private schools, while 85 percent of students who did not receive scholarships attended
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public sector schools. In addition, it appears that control group contamination should not strongly
impact our analysis, as only 5 percent of students who did not receive a scholarship to their first
choice school are identified as enrolled in private schools in 2012-13. Nevertheless, it is also
important to note that over 10 percent of lottery losers do not appear in our testing data in year 1.
In contrast, only 5 percent of lottery winners are missing year 1 outcome data. These missing
outcome observations could represent control-group crossovers attending private schools or
students that moved out of Louisiana in the 2012-13 school year. Unfortunately, our reliance on
the state testing data does not allow us to distinguish the causes behind these missing data.
Table 1
Year 1 Enrollment Patterns by Scholarship Award
Treatment Group
Received Scholarship to
First Choice School
Private School
Public School
Unknown School
Total

N
550
143
34
727

%
76%
20%
5%
100%

Control Group
Did Not Receive
Scholarship to First Choice
School
N
%
60
5%
1,005
85%
116
10%
1,181
100%

Total

610
1,148
150
1,908

Notes. Sample represents all students with baseline testing data in grades three through seven who did not list a
special education exclusion on the LSP application and who were not identified as multiple birth siblings. For
students in the treatment group attending public schools, 72 percent attended a traditional public school, 25 percent
attended a charter school, and 3 percent attended a magnet school. The corresponding percentages for the control
group members attending a public school are: 74 percent attended a traditional public school, 16 percent attended a
charter school, and 9 percent attended a magnet school.
Source. Authors’ calculations.

Finally, it should be noted that our outcome data response rate of nearly 90 percent
overall for the analytic sample is much higher than the outcome response rate for any previous
experimental evaluation of a voucher program, giving us some confidence that any nonresponse
bias is trivial. Nevertheless, the differential rates of non-response between the treatment (5
percent) and control (10 percent) groups are concerning (What Works Clearinghouse, 2014).
While our primary results will not account for these differences, we examine the extent to which
26

differential attrition biases our results using two separate bounding procedures. In general, the
results of these analyses do not suggest the estimated results are substantially influenced by
differential attrition.
Baseline Equivalence
The final step required before moving on to our empirical analysis of the participant
effects of the statewide expansion of the LSP is to analyze the extent to which the LSP lottery
process actually ensured independence of assignment to the treatment and control groups. While
we cannot know the extent to which members of the treatment and control group differ on
unobservable characteristics, we can get a good idea of the success of the lottery process by
examining if there is baseline equivalence in observable characteristics between lottery winners
and losers. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 2, which provides the results of ttests for differences in means on key baseline covariates between members of the treatment and
control groups included in our analysis sample, with p < .10 as the lowest threshold of statistical
significance.22
The results presented in Table 2 are favorable for our analysis, as nearly all of the
estimated differences between lottery winners and losers are statistically insignificant, suggesting
that we have adequately identified lotteries in our analytical sample. The sole exception is that
lottery winners provided significantly fewer school preferences on average than lottery losers.23

All analyses include fixed effects for one’s first school choice lottery to account for different
probabilities of selection.
23
While our primary models do not explicitly account for these differences, we perform a series
of robustness checks examining the extent to which our findings are sensitive to the number of
school choices offered. In general, the estimated effects in models controlling for the number of
school preferences offered are not distinguishably different from our primary model findings.
22
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Table 2
Baseline Equivalence of Treatment & Control Groups on Covariates
Lottery
Lottery
Winners
Losers
(N=693)
(N=1,073)
Female
0.51
0.51
Race/Ethnicity
African American
0.90
0.91
Hispanic
0.02
0.01
White
0.07
0.06
Other
0.02
0.01
Free-or-Reduced Price Lunch
0.01
0.01
Limited English Proficiency
0.86
0.87
Number of School Preferences Listed
2.14
2.32
Standardized Performance†
ELA Scale Score
-0.38
-0.37
Math Scale Score
-0.41
-0.46
Science Scale Score
-0.50
-0.51
Social Studies Scale Score
-0.42
-0.42

Diff.

p

0.00

0.99

-0.01
0.57
0.01
0.40
0.00
0.97
0.00
0.70
0.00
0.93
-0.01
0.47
-0.18*** <0.01
-0.02
0.05
0.00
0.00

0.71
0.30
0.94
0.98

*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10
† Scores are standardized within grade based on the observed distributions of scale scores across Louisiana.
Notes. The analysis sample excludes students with disabilities, multiple birth siblings, and individuals without
baseline testing data in grades three through seven. All analyses include fixed effects for one’s first school choice
lottery.
Source. Authors’ calculations.

Results
This section presents the results of our preliminary analyses of the first year impacts of
the statewide expansion of the LSP on student achievement.
Primary Estimates of the Impact of Using an LSP on Student Achievement
The primary results of our preliminary LATE analyses are presented in Table 3. Columns
(1) through (3) present the results based on ELA performance and columns (4) through (6)
present the results for math. In addition, it should be noted that the results from the first stage
regressions for the models presented in Table 3 (see Table A1 in the Appendix) all indicate that
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LSP scholarship receipt is highly predictive of usage.24 These findings support our claim that our
results represent unbiased estimates of the effect of LSP scholarship usage on student
achievement after one year.
In general, LSP scholarship users are found to score significantly worse than their control
group counterparts on the state’s ELA and math exams. In particular, students who used an LSP
scholarship to enroll in private schools are found to score about a quarter of a standard deviation
behind their control group counterparts in ELA achievement and over a two-thirds of a standard
deviation behind in math per year of private school attendance.25 These estimates are statistically
significant, substantial, and unprecedented in the literature.
The performance of the baseline covariates in the regressions provides us with some
confidence that the estimation of the voucher impact is valid and reliable. Students’ baseline
achievement scores are highly predictive of their outcome scores, at a level comparable to or
even better than those observed in previous analyses (e.g. Howell et al., 2002). Female students
outperformed males, in both ELA and math, all else equal. White and Hispanic students tend to
score higher than African American students in ELA; and FRL eligible students tend to perform
worse than their counterparts in math. While the majority of these estimates are not statistically
significant, it is important to see that they are largely in the expected direction.

24

In particular, LSP scholarship receipt is associated with a 70 percent increase in the likelihood
of using a scholarship to enroll in a private school across all models. In addition, the associated
joint F-statistics are substantially greater than Staiger and Stock’s (1997) recommended
threshold for instrumental variable relevance.
25
The results presented in Table 3 do not appear to be driven by a dramatic achievement gains in
the control group relative to the treatment group (see figures A1 and A2 in the Appendix).
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Table 3
Estimated Effects of LSP Enrollment Exposure on Student Achievement
ELA
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
LSP Enrollment
0.21*** 0.22*** 0.22***
0.65***
Exposure
(0.07)
(0.07)
(0.08)
(0.09)
0.66*** 0.65*** 0.65***
0.63***
Baseline Achievement
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.03)
0.15*** 0.15***
Female
(0.04)
(0.04)
-0.18** 0.18***
FRL
(0.08)
(0.07)
Race/Ethnicity†
0.13
0.13
Hispanic
(0.18)
(0.17)
0.11
0.11
White
(0.09)
(0.09)
-0.04
-0.04
Other
(0.15)
(0.11)
0.16*
In New Orleans School
(0.09)
N
1,766
1,766
1,766
1,766
Risk Sets
194
194
194
194
Within R-squared
0.42
0.43
0.43
0.39
Between R-Squared
0.44
0.42
0.41
0.30
Overall R-Squared
0.42
0.42
0.42
0.38

Math
(5)
0.65***
(0.09)
0.62***
(0.02)
0.10**
(0.04)

(6)
0.65***
(0.09)
0.62***
(0.02)
0.10**
(0.05)

0.03
(0.07)

0.03
(0.07)

0.25**
(0.11)
0.24***
(0.07)
0.04
(0.21)

0.25*
(0.14)
0.24***
(0.06)
0.04
(0.17)
0.04
(0.10)
1,766
194
0.39
0.31
0.38

1,766
194
0.39
0.30
0.38

*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10
† Excluded comparison group is African American students
Notes. Performance measures standardized within grade based on control group score distributions. All models
include risk set fixed effects. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering within risk sets.
Source. Authors’ calculations.

At the same time, it is important to note that these results are based on a subset of
students (approximately twenty percent of all eligible LSP applicants). Furthermore, given that
the observed grades are not typical entry grades for schools, these effects may not be
representative of the experiences of participants to the all LSP participants. Nevertheless, these
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caveats aside, the results presented in Table 3 indicate sizeable negative one-year achievement
impacts, especially in math, associated with winning an LSP scholarship.26
Subgroup Analysis
In addition to estimating the general impacts of participation in the LSP on student
achievement, we are interested in how various student subgroups respond to the treatment. Table
4 presents LATE estimates for three subgroup comparisons: females versus males, African
Americans compared to other students, and LSP scholarship users enrolling in New Orleans
schools compared to students enrolling in private schools in other locations.27 Joint F statistics
from first stage regressions predicting LSP usage and an interaction of LSP usage and a
subgroup identifier are presented along with the overall results. Each of the reported F-statistics
suggests that the LSP scholarship receipt is a relevant predictor of usage.
In general, the results presented in Table 4 do not reflect substantial heterogeneous effects
among the examined subgroups of students. In general, while the point estimates are slightly
different for each subgroup, the results suggest that LSP scholarship users performed
significantly worse than their counterparts in both ELA and math, irrespective of their
backgrounds.28 A single exception is observed in the New Orleans subgroup analysis, which
suggests that students using the scholarship in New Orleans experienced significantly more
negative math impacts than other students. Nevertheless, it is important to note that these results

26

While our analysis focuses on differences in ELA and math achievement, we have confirmed
that these large negative effects are equally present in both science and social studies
achievement. In particular, the results presented in Appendix Table A2 indicate that eligible
applicants offered an LSP scholarship were about a third of a standard deviation behind their
control group counterparts in science and over forty percent of a standard deviation behind in
social studies.
27
The results are based on the models that include terms interacting predicted LSP exposure with
the particular subgroup of interest.
28
It is interesting to note that our results suggest that African American LSP users experience
worse performance impacts than other LSP users when one considers prior RCT evaluations of
school voucher programs (see, for example, Howell, Wolf, Campbell, & Peterson, 2002).
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are likely reflective of a collinearity issue because risk set fixed effects include one’s application
school. By including risk set fixed effects, we are effectively limiting our comparisons to
students in the same priority category applying to the same school and grade. Our regression
results are therefore based on within-risk set variation, or cases in which there is sufficient
variation within the risk set group in the given characteristics. The New Orleans subgroup
analysis, for example, is based solely on those risk sets that include both students living in New
Orleans and those not living in New Orleans in 2011-12. Given that individuals are highly likely
to choose a private school in their parish, it is unlikely that many risk sets are contributing to the
subgroup estimates for New Orleans. We therefore strongly recommend against generalizing
them to New Orleans as a whole.
Finally, we examine the extent to which the estimated effects vary across the LSP
applicant baseline achievement distribution. It would be particularly concerning, for example, to
find that the negative effects are largely captured by students who were already among the worst
performers at entry. The results presented in Table 5 provide a descriptive examination of the
different ways students in the bottom, middle, and top third of the baseline achievement
distribution experienced the LSP after one year. Specifically, Table 5 presents results of
regressions run separately on these three performance subgroups. Column 1 presents the
subgroup sample size; column 2 provides descriptive information for the control group’s year 1
performance distribution for the selected sample; column 3 presents results for regressions that
only control for baseline achievement and student risk set; and column 4 presents results for fully
specified models additionally controlling for student demographics and residence.
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Table 4
Estimated Effects of LSP Usage by Subgroup
ELA
(1)
(2)
Gender Subgroup Analysis

(3)

(4)

Female

-0.22***
(0.08)

-0.22**
(0.09)

-0.23***
(0.08)

Male

-0.20**
(0.08)
-0.01
(0.10)

-0.21*
(0.11)
-0.02
(0.12)

-0.21**
(0.08)
-0.02
(0.09)

0.65***
(0.11)
0.65***
(0.11)
0.01
(0.11)

255.6
443.9

227.9
395.5

505.8
881.7

Difference

First stage F
Exposure
507.3
Interaction
881.1
Race/Ethnicity Subgroup Analysis
African American

Not African American
Difference
First stage F
Exposure
Interaction

-0.15
(0.19)
-0.07
(0.19)

-0.14
(0.16)
-0.08
(0.15)

-0.15
(0.17)
-0.08
(0.16)

0.68***
(0.10)
0.44***
(0.12)
-0.23
(0.14)

507.0
541.2

340.8
362.0

292.9
310.3

505.5
539.8

-0.22***
(0.07)

-0.22*** -0.23***
(0.08)
(0.08)

Math
(5)

(6)

-0.65***
(0.11)

-0.65***
(0.10)

-0.66***
(0.12)
0.01
(0.12)

-0.66***
(0.11)
0.01
(0.10)

254.7
444.1

227.0
395.6

-0.68***
(0.09)

-0.68***
(0.11)

-0.44***
(0.16)
-0.24
(0.15)

-0.44***
(0.16)
-0.24
(0.16)

339.5
360.9

291.7
309.3

New Orleans Subgroup Analysis
New Orleans Student

Other Student
Difference
First stage F
Exposure
Interaction
Model Summary
Demographic
Controls

-0.28
(0.23)

-0.29
(0.22)

-0.21***
(0.07)
-0.08
(0.21)

-0.21**
(0.09)
-0.08
(0.25)

1.00***
(0.32)
0.61***
(0.09)
-0.40*
(0.23)

522.6
364.9

234.1
161.8

521.1
360.9

X

X
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-1.00***
(0.22)
-0.61***
(0.11)
-0.39*
(0.24)
233.2
159.9

X

X

New Orleans
Control
N
Risk Sets

1766
194

X
1766
194

1766
194

1766
194

X
1766
194

X
1766
194

*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10
Notes. Performance measures standardized within grade based on control group score distributions. All models
include risk set fixed effects. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering within risk sets.
Source. Authors’ calculations.
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The results presented in Table 5 suggest that students in the bottom third of the ELA
achievement distribution at baseline performed no differently than control group students after
one year. On the other hand, the LATE estimates for the middle and top performers largely
mirror the overall significant negative finding presented in Table 3.
Table 5
Estimated Effects of LSP Usage by Baseline Performance Group
Baseline achievement
group

N
(1)

Bottom third

591

Middle third

596

Top third

579

Bottom third

608

Middle third

582

Top third

576

Control group
mean/sd
(2)
ELA achievement
-0.788
(0.97)
0.021
(0.66)
0.721
(0.73)
Math achievement
-0.651
(0.68)
-0.062
(0.23)
-0.765
(0.73)

LSP effect
without
covariates
(3)

LSP effect
with covariates
(4)

0.11
(0.13)
-0.27**
(0.13)
-0.28***
(0.10)

0.09
(0.15)
-0.30**
(0.14)
-0.26**
(0.12)

-0.71***
(0.21)
-0.60***
(0.15)
-0.68***
(0.14)

-0.73***
(0.19)
-0.61***
(0.15)
-0.67***
(0.13)

*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10
Notes. Performance measures standardized within grade based on control group score distributions. All models
include risk set fixed effects. Results presented in column 3 are based on models that only control for student
baseline achievement. Results presented in column 4 are based on models additionally including controls for
demographics and being a New Orleans resident. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering within risk
sets.
Source. Authors’ calculations.

In contrast, the findings for math suggest that all groups experienced significant declines
in achievement when using an LSP scholarship. While the coefficient estimates indicate that
students in the bottom and top thirds of the math achievement distribution at baseline performed
relatively worse than those in the middle, it is important to note that these estimates are
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particularly noisy—which is to be expected given the smaller sample sizes—and the 95 percent
confidence intervals for each of the regressions largely overlap.
Thus, in general, the results presented in Table 5 suggest that students performing poorly
in ELA at baseline did not experience large achievement declines after using an LSP scholarship
and the negative effects of the program were largely experienced uniformly among remaining
students.
Robustness Checks
In general, our analyses indicate that participation in the first year of the statewide
expansion of the LSP negatively impacted student achievement on Louisiana’s state assessments.
These negative findings are unique among random assignment evaluations of school voucher
programs, all of which have found insignificant or positive outcomes. Given the uniqueness and
magnitude of these estimated effects, especially in math, it is important to test if the results are
sensitive to our chosen analytic strategy. This section presents the results from sensitivity
analyses designed to test the robustness of our findings.
Sensitivity of results to differential attrition. Our first robustness check examines the
extent to which our estimated effects are sensitive to the different rates of attrition observed
between treatment and control group members in our sample. Specifically, we find that 108—or
9.1 percent—of students who did not win an LSP to their first choice school do not appear in the
state’s assessment data in 2012-13; whereas only 4.4 percent of LSP winners are missing. While
this difference is not cause for great concern (What Works Clearinghouse, 2014), it is important
to consider if differential attrition is driving our primary findings.
If we can assume the observed differences in attrition are due to random factors, our
LATE estimates are generally less precise but are not biased by differential attrition (Gerber &
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Green, 2012). On the other hand, if the observed differences are due to systemic, yet
unobservable, sample selection effects, our primary estimates of the effect of using an LSP
scholarship on student achievement are biased (Gerber & Green, 2012; Lee, 2009). If, for
example, those in the control group with higher expected outcomes both in public and private
school leave the sample with higher probability, our LATE estimates will be positively biased.
In this section, we examine the extent to which differential attrition may be biasing our
results by using two bounding strategies. The first, developed by Lee (2009) and hereafter
referred to as “Lee Bounds”, involves removing a subset of applicants from the treatment group
in an attempt to parse out marginal individuals who have selected into the sample only because
they received an LSP scholarship.29 In particular, Lee shows that if you can assume that
problematic attrition is only present in either the treatment or control group, then you can
effectively bound the average treatment effect for individuals whose treatment status does not
influence their sample selection likelihood by trimming away from that group a percentage of
applicants equal to the attrition difference from the bottom and top performers. These trimming
procedures produce upper and lower bounds of the effect, respectively.
One of the primary benefits of Lee’s bounding method is that it does not require strong
assumptions on the selection mechanism producing the attrition problems beyond the assumption
that the effect is only present in either the treatment or control groups. For example, one need not
assume that control group attritors are either more- or less-academically able than students who

Lee’s (2009) bounding method is built on two assumptions: that the assignment mechanism is
random and that sample selection is a monotonic function of treatment status. The first
assumption is easily satisfied by the LSP lottery process. The second assumption essentially
requires that there are no LSP applicants who were assigned an LSP scholarship but decided to
forgo their scholarship and instead enroll in a private school at their own expense. While we
cannot validate this assumption empirically, it seems highly unlikely that such “defiers” exist in
our data—especially given the program’s income threshold.
29
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actively choose to remain in the sample. Nevertheless, the simplicity of Lee’s method comes at a
cost: Lee bounds can be quite large—especially in the presence of large differences in
nonresponse rates. In contrast, Angrist, Bettinger, and Kremer (2006)—hereafter “ABK”—note
that one can estimate tighter bounds of a program’s effect on individuals who would always
select into the sample by assuming that attrition is more likely to come from one of the tails of
the outcome variable. For example, if we assume that the differential attrition rate we observe in
our control group is largely explained by more advantaged families opting to enroll in private
schools at their own expense, we can use the ABK method by focusing on estimating effects at
the lower end of the observed outcome distribution.30 Effectively, the ABK method assumes that
individuals whose sample selection decision is conditional on their treatment status are likely to
be present around a particular margin in the outcome distribution; and we should therefore focus
on the other side of the outcome distribution to bound the estimated effect for the subgroup of
students who would always select into the sample.
Table 6 presents both the original LATE estimates produced in Table 3–included as a
reference—as well as results from the two bounding exercises described. Columns 2 through 4
present models controlling only for baseline achievement and risk set while columns 5 through 7
present models that additionally include controls for demographics and residence.
As expected, the Lee bounds presented in Table 6 are quite large, with gaps of over 30
percent of a standard deviation in achievement. Despite the magnitude of these gaps, the results
for math are consistent with LSP scholarship usage having a negative effect on achievement. In

30

Simple comparisons of baseline characteristics indicate that control-group attriters performed
slightly worse in both math and ELA on average relative to the control group average. While this
suggests that we should instead focus on the top end of the performance distribution, we cannot
rule out the possibility that these applicants had stronger growth potential than other control
group students.
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contrast, the results for ELA suggest that—in a best case scenario—LSP scholarship usage may
have had an insignificant effect on student achievement after one year. Given the magnitude of
the estimated effect, along with the knowledge that these estimates are based on removing the
lowest performers from the treatment group, we are hesitant to conclude that the overall effect of
the LSP on ELA achievement was null in the first year of the statewide expansion. Nevertheless,
if this assumption is met, the results presented in Table 6 suggest the possibility that the two
groups did not differ in ELA achievement after one year.
The ABK bounding procedure yields similar results for math: for the most part all lower
and upper ABK bounds indicate a large negative effect of LSP scholarship usage on math
achievement after one year. In contrast, the ABK results for ELA are insignificant in all cases.
While this is likely due to the substantially smaller sample sizes used to construct ABK bounds,
this finding does correspond with the earlier subgroup analysis indicating that students with
lower ELA achievement at baseline did not tend to experience large declines in performance
associated with LSP scholarship usage.
In general, the results presented in this section do not suggest that differential attrition has
strongly biased the primary results presented in Table 3. Specifically, unless we make fairly
restrictive assumptions, LSP scholarship usage continues to be associated with negative impacts
in both math and ELA achievement. Furthermore, given that we do not know the reason for the
higher attrition rates observed among the control group, we generally prefer the Lee bounds over
the ABK bounds. While our upper bound estimate of the LSP effect on ELA achievement using
Lee’s bounds is indeed statistically insignificant, we caution the reader against using this extreme
estimate to serve as the program’s effect on student achievement after one year.
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Table 6
Accounting for Differential Attrition
N
(Lower bound / Upper bound)
(1)
Primary LATE
Lee bounds

1,766
1,733 / 1,731

without covariates
Primary
Lower
Upper
LATE
bound
bound
(2)
(3)
(4)
ELA achievement
-0.21***
(0.06)
-0.28***
-0.05
(0.06)
(0.05)

Primary
LATE
(5)

with covariates
Lower
Upper
bound
bound
(6)
(7)

-0.22***
(0.06)
-0.29***
(0.09)

-0.06
(0.06)

-0.16
(0.15)
-0.13
(0.15)
(7.12)

0.12
(0.14)
0.17
(0.13)
(0.83)

ABK bounds
30th percentile
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25th percentile

Primary LATE
Lee bounds

528 / 610
431 / 506

1,766
1,733 / 1,727

-0.11
(0.15)
-0.10
(0.16)
(1544.82)
Math achievement
-0.65***
(0.10)
-0.72***
(0.08)

0.15
(0.12)
0.20
(0.12)
(0.89)

-0.43***
(0.07)

-0.72***
(0.08)

-0.44***
(0.07)

-0.94***
(0.18)
-0.96***
(0.24)

-0.30**
(0.13)
-0.26*
(0.13)

-0.97***
(0.18)
-0.98***
(0.27)

-0.33**
(0.16)
-0.27
(0.18)

-0.65***
(0.09)

ABK bounds
30th percentile

522 / 641

25th percentile

433 / 554

*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10
Notes. Performance measures standardized within grade based on control group score distributions. All models include risk set fixed effects. Lee bounds lower
bounds are based on removing the top 4.8 percent of performers from the treatment group and Lee upper bounds are based on removing the bottom 4.8 percent.
Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering within risk sets.
Source. Authors’ calculations.

Sensitivity of results to definitions of enrollment and lotteries. Our second check
examines the sensitivity of results to our chosen definitions of LSP scholarship usage and what
constitutes a lottery. Regarding scholarship usage, we have up to this point largely focused on
enrollment exposure—or the percentage of quarters an individual used an LSP scholarship to
enroll in a private school—to capture the effects of the LSP in the first year of statewide
expansion. Alternatively, we could identify the effects of LSP scholarship usage using a
dichotomous variable simply indicating if a student ever attended a private school (Wolf et al.,
2010). In addition, we have chosen to define lotteries as cases in which a group of individuals
that had the same priority category and who applied to the same grade in the same school had an
observed chance of winning a lottery greater than 0 but less than 100. Thus, as another
robustness check, we examine the extent to which our estimated effects differ in a subsample
based on a restricted definition of what constitutes a lottery. Given the unexpected direction and
magnitude of our findings, we would hope that our results are not sensitive to such definitions.
Table 7 presents the results from models using alternative definitions of enrollment and
lotteries. For the sake of comparison, Columns (1) and (4) duplicate the results for the most
specified versions of our primary models presented in Table 3. In columns (2) and (5), we
present the results of models substituting a variable indicating if a student ever used their LSP to
enroll in a private school for our variable indicating the percentage of private school enrollment.
Columns (3) and (6), on the other hand, present the results of analyses that mirror our primary
models, but in which we have restricted the analytical sample to individuals who have
participated in lotteries with winning percentages varying between 5 and 95 percent.
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Table 7
Estimated LSP Usage Effects Using Alternative Definitions of Enrollment and Lotteries
ELA
Math
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
LSP Enrollment
Exposure
0.22***
0.22***
0.65***
0.65***
(0.08)
(0.07)
(0.09)
(0.10)
LSP Ever Enrolled
0.21***
0.63***
(0.07)
(0.09)
Baseline Achievement
0.65*** 0.65*** 0.65***
0.62*** 0.62*** 0.62***
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.03)
Female
0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15***
0.10**
0.11**
0.10**
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.05)
FRL
0.18*** -0.18** 0.18***
0.03
0.03
0.03
(0.07)
(0.07)
(0.07)
(0.07)
(0.07)
(0.08)
Race/Ethnicity
Hispanic
0.13
0.12
0.13
0.25*
0.24**
0.26**
(0.17)
(0.15)
(0.16)
(0.14)
(0.12)
(0.12)
White
0.11
0.11
0.12
0.24*** 0.23*** 0.25***
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.06)
(0.06)
(0.07)
Other
-0.04
-0.04
-0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
(0.11)
(0.14)
(0.12)
(0.17)
(0.21)
(0.17)
In New Orleans School
0.16*
0.16
0.16
0.04
0.03
0.04
(0.09)
(0.10)
(0.12)
(0.10)
(0.11)
(0.12)
N
Risk Sets
Within R-squared
Between R-Squared
Overall R-Squared

1766
194
0.43
0.41
0.42

1766
194
0.43
0.40
0.42

1748
193
0.43
0.41
0.42

1766
194
0.39
0.31
0.38

1766
194
0.39
0.31
0.38

1748
193
0.39
0.31
0.38

*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10
Notes. Performance measures standardized within grade based on control group score distributions. All models
include risk set fixed effects. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering within risk sets.
Source. Authors’ calculations.

The results presented in Table 7 clearly indicate that our results are sensitive neither to
our definition of enrollment or lottery. While we can continue to explore the sensitivity of these
results to alternative definitions of enrollment or even more restrictive definitions of lotteries, the
stability of the results presented in Table 7 lends support to our primary analyses.
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Accounting for differences in the number of school preferences offered. The baseline
equivalency results presented in Table 2 indicate that eligible LSP applicants who won an LSP to
their first choice school offered slightly fewer school choices on average relative to applicants
who did not receive a scholarship to their first choice school. The analyses presented thus far
have not directly accounted for this difference. Instead, we have effectively assumed that the
statistical significance of this finding is essentially due to random chance.
In Table 8, we examine the extent to which our primary estimates are affected by this
assumption by including fixed effects capturing the number of school preferences offered by a
student. Columns 1 through 3 present findings for ELA achievement and columns 4 through 6
present our findings for math. The models employ more control variables as one moves from left
to right within each performance grouping. The excluded comparison group for school choices is
one. By using fixed effects, as opposed to a continuous variable identifying the number of school
preferences offered, we are allowing for maximum flexibility in capturing differences in LSP
applicants offering different numbers of school options.
In general, the results presented in Table 8 strongly mirror those presented in Table 3:
LSP scholarship users are found to be 22 percent of a standard deviation behind the control
group in ELA achievement after one year and 66 percent of a standard deviation behind in math.
Furthermore, the coefficient estimates for the included school preference grouping fixed effects
are insignificant in nearly every case, indicating that students offering more than one school
preference generally do not differ in final achievement relative to applicants offering only one
option. Thus, the results presented in Table 8 generally suggest that the significant difference
between treatment and control group members in the number of school preferences offered is
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unlikely to have strongly biased our estimates of the effect of using an LSP scholarship on
student achievement after one year.
Table 8
Estimated Effects of LSP Usage Comparing Individuals Offering the Same Number of School
Preferences
ELA achievement
Math achievement
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
-0.22** -0.22*** -0.22***
-0.65*** -0.65*** -0.66***
LSP Enrollment Exposure
(0.08)
(0.07)
(0.07)
(0.10)
(0.11)
(0.09)
School preferences offered†
-0.07
-0.06
-0.07
-0.12*
-0.10
-0.10
Two
(0.07)
(0.07)
(0.07)
(0.06)
(0.06)
(0.07)
-0.04
-0.04
-0.04
-0.06
-0.04
-0.04
Three
(0.07)
(0.06)
(0.07)
(0.07)
(0.07)
(0.07)
-0.03
-0.03
-0.03
-0.06
-0.05
-0.05
Four
(0.08)
(0.07)
(0.07)
(0.07)
(0.07)
(0.08)
-0.11
-0.10
-0.10
-0.08
-0.06
-0.06
Five
(0.09)
(0.08)
(0.10)
(0.11)
(0.08)
(0.10)
Model Summary
Demographic controls
X
X
X
X
New Orleans control
X
X
N
1,766
1,766
1,766
1,766
1,766
1,766
Risk sets
194
194
194
194
194
194
*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10
† - Excluded comparison group is students who only offered one school preference.
Notes. Performance measures standardized within grade based on control group score distributions. All models
include risk set fixed effects. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering within risk sets.
Source. Authors’ calculations.

Curricular advantage? Prior experimental analyses examining the achievement impacts
of public and private voucher programs have not found any statistically significant negative
program impacts. Thus, our findings of substantial negative first year impacts of statewide
expansion of the LSP are surprising. At the same time, it is important to recognize that our
analyses are based on achievement on the Louisiana state assessments, rather than nationally
representative exams. These results may simply reflect the fact that public schools are operating
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with curricula that are already aligned with the state assessments, while private schools have yet
to align their curricula.
While we cannot provide an exhaustive examination of the teaching methods of the
private schools in our sample, our testing data allow us to partially examine this question. We
test for a curricular advantage by making use of the fact that some of the Louisiana state
assessments include both criterion-referenced and norm-referenced exam questions. In particular,
while the Louisiana assessments in grades four and eight only include criterion-referenced items,
the iLEAP assessments offered in grades three, five, six, and seven include both criterion- and
norm-referenced exam questions. If public school students experience a disproportionate
curricular advantage, one would expect smaller negative LATE impact estimates on the iLEAP
exams than on the LEAP exams.
Table 9 presents results from models examining the extent to which LSP usage effects
differ across test type. For both ELA and math, we find that students taking the LEAP exam do
appear to perform worse than iLEAP takers; however the estimated differences are statistically
insignificant in all but one case. While not definitive, this pattern of results suggests that the
substantial negative LATE impact estimates could be partially driven by the stronger alignment
of the public school curricula to the state assessments. At the same time, it is important to note
that LSP scholarship users still performed quite poorly on the hybrid iLEAP exams. Thus, while
these findings may provide some insight into the substantial magnitude of our estimated impacts,
they nevertheless support the general finding of a negative overall effect of the program after one
year.
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Table 9
Estimated LSP Scholarship Usage Effects by Test Type
ELA
(1)
(2)
(3)
LSP User taking iLEAP -0.18*** 0.18*** -0.19***
(CRT-NRT Hybrid)
(0.07)
(0.10)
(0.06)
LSP User taking LEAP
-0.31*
-0.33*
-0.34**
(CRT only)
(0.19)
(0.19)
(0.18)
-0.11
-0.14
-0.14
Difference
(0.17)
(0.20)
(0.22)
Model Summary
Demographic Controls
New Orleans Control
N
Risk Sets
First stage F
Exposure
Interaction

X
1,766
194

1,766
194

X
X
1,766
194

686.1
409.7

259.5
155.3

231.3
137.9

(4)

Math
(5)

(6)

-0.57*** -0.56*** -0.56***
(0.08)
(0.09)
(0.09)
-0.90*** -0.92*** -0.92***
(0.16)
(0.16)
(0.16)
-0.33*
-0.35
-0.35
(0.20)
(0.23)
(0.26)

1,766
194

X
X
1,766
194

X
X
1,766
194

684.1
409.5

258.4
155.2

230.3
137.9

*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10
Notes. Performance measures standardized within grade based on control group score distributions. All models
include risk set fixed effects. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering within risk sets.
Source. Authors’ calculations.

Conclusion
This paper presents the preliminary analyses of the first year participant effects of the
statewide expansion of the Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP), one of the newest and largest
school voucher programs in the U.S. This study contributes to the existing literature on the
participant effects of publicly funded voucher programs for two reasons. First, it uses a highly
rigorous experimental design to estimate treatment effects while avoiding self-selection bias
concerns. Second, it is the first evaluation of a statewide school voucher program. These
contributions will add to the existing knowledge on the effects of private school choice
programs.
The results presented in this paper indicate significant and substantial negative
achievement impacts associated with using an LSP scholarship. In general, we find that LSP
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scholarship usage is associated with a quarter of a standard deviation decline in ELA
achievement and nearly two-thirds of a standard deviation decline in math. These findings are
the first of their kind among random assignment evaluations of school voucher programs and are
robust to several alternative specifications.
At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that our analyses are based on a small
subsample of participants in the first year of the program with performance data on the Louisiana
state assessments. Specifically, our analysis sample represents approximately twenty percent of
the 2012 cohort of eligible applicants. Thus, in a real sense, this paper is not an evaluation of the
entire program, but an evaluation of the experiences of students in grades three through seven at
baseline, who participated in actual lotteries, with testing outcomes in year 1. The educational
impact of the LSP on the many thousands of program participants who do not satisfy those
criteria remains, at this point, unknown. Readers are encouraged not to draw firm conclusions
from this initial analysis due to the severe threats to external validity posed by those limitations
of the sample.
At this point we can only speculate as to why our results differ so dramatically from the
voucher experiments conducted previously. Our working hypothesis at this point is that a higherquality set of private schools participated in earlier voucher and scholarship programs in
Washington, DC; New York City; Dayton, Ohio; and Charlotte, North Carolina; in which more
positive voucher experimental impacts were reported. Less than one-third of the private schools
in Louisiana chose to participate in the LSP in its first year, possibly because of the extensive
regulations placed on the program by government authorities (Kisida, Wolf, & Rhinesmith,
2015). Although it is only speculation at this point, the Louisiana Scholarship Program
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regulatory requirements may have played a role in preventing the private school choice program
from delivering better outcomes to its participants.
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Appendix
Table A1
First Stage Regression Results Using LSP Receipt to Predict Usage
ELA
Math
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
0.70*** 0.70*** 0.70***
0.70*** 0.70*** 0.70***
LSP Awarded
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Demographic controls
X
X
X
X
New Orleans School Control
X
X
N
Risk Sets
Joint F-statistic
Adj. R-Squared

1766
194
1014.39
0.66

1766
194
292.25
0.66

1766
194
256.43
0.66

1766
194
1011.56
0.66

1766
194
291.17
0.66

1766
194
306.75
0.65

*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10
Notes. Performance measures standardized within grade based on control group score distributions. All models
include risk set fixed effects. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering within risk sets.
Source. Authors’ calculations.
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Table A2
Estimated effects of LSP Usage on Science and Social Studies Achievement
Science
Social Studies
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
LSP Enrollment
0.35*** 0.36*** 0.35***
0.42*** 0.42*** 0.43***
Exposure
(0.07)
(0.07)
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.09)
(0.08)
0.53*** 0.52*** 0.52***
0.46*** 0.45*** 0.45***
Baseline Achievement
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.03)
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.02
Female
(0.04)
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.05)
-0.20** -0.20**
-0.18
-0.18**
FRL
(0.10)
(0.09)
(0.12)
(0.09)
Race/Ethnicity
0.30** 0.30***
0.07
0.07
Hispanic
(0.12)
(0.12)
(0.15)
(0.14)
0.33*** 0.33***
0.28*** 0.28***
White
(0.08)
(0.09)
(0.08)
(0.08)
0.23
0.22
-0.09
-0.09
Other
(0.19)
(0.17)
(0.16)
(0.16)
-0.07
0.08
In New Orleans School
(0.11)
(0.13)
N
1,744
1,744
1,744
1,743
1,743
1,743
Risk Sets
194
194
194
194
194
194
Within R-squared
0.31
0.32
0.32
0.24
0.24
0.24
Between R-Squared
0.31
0.32
0.32
0.17
0.17
0.17
Overall R-Squared
0.31
0.33
0.32
0.24
0.24
0.24
*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10
Notes. Performance measures standardized within grade based on control group score distributions. All models
include risk set fixed effects. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering within risk sets.
Source. Authors’ calculations.
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Figure A1. Comparison of treatment and control group average ELA performance over time.
Achievement has been standardized by grade and year to the Louisiana state test taking
distribution. Dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals for the performance averages.
These results indicate that control group students did experience a mild improvement relative to
the state over time; however treatment group students experienced a large decline in performance
between 2011-12 and 2012-13.
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Figure A2. Comparison of treatment and control group average math performance over time.
Achievement has been standardized by grade and year to the Louisiana state test taking
distribution. Dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals for the performance averages.
These results indicate that control group students did experience a mild improvement relative to
the state over time; however treatment group students experienced a large decline in performance
between 2011-12 and 2012-13.
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Chapter 231
Measures of Non-cognitive Skills and Political Tolerance after Two Years

Introduction
While the majority of quantitative studies examining the effects of school choice
programs on participating students have tended to focus on academic and attainment outcomes, a
growing body of research suggests that other skills should also play an important role in such
evaluations (Mills, 2013). Specifically, studies have found that character skills such as
conscientiousness and self-control are predictive of individual academic and workforce success
(Almlund et al. 2011; Heckman & Kautz, 2012; Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). More
importantly, evidence from some studies suggests that different education environments can
influence these skills (Cunha & Heckman, 2008; Dee & West, 2011; Jackson, 2012; West et al.,
2014). While two recent studies have examined the relationship between enrollment in charter
schools and non-cognitive skills (Dobbie & Fryer, 2014; West et al., 2014); no such research
exists for private school voucher programs. This paper aims to address this gap by providing the
first descriptive analysis of differences in non-cognitive skills and measures of political tolerance
associated with the Louisiana Scholarship Program.
Specifically, we examine differences in student responses to several measures of noncognitive skills and political tolerance collected through a phone survey conducted between
November, 2014 and February, 2015. The specific non-cognitive skills measures included in our
analysis are the Grit scale (Duckworth & Quinn, 2012), the Locus of Control scale (Rotter,
1966), and the Rosenberg’s (1965) Self-esteem scale. In general, the findings presented in this
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paper suggest no strong differences between students who received an LSP scholarship and those
who did not across all measures. These findings hold across several specifications and robustness
checks.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe the
existing literature examining the development of non-cognitive skills and civic attitudes in
private school choice systems. We then outline the methodology used to estimate differences in
these skills in the first group of students to experience the expansion of the Louisiana
Scholarship Program statewide. Next, we present our primary results and a series of checks
designed to estimate the robustness of our findings. Finally, we conclude with a summary of our
findings and implications for future research.
Alternative outcomes and school choice
Evaluations of school voucher programs have generally focused on estimating voucher
impacts on student achievement and attainment (Mills, 2013). The focus on academic outcomes
is intuitive, as student achievement is strongly linked to the economic success of individuals
(Heckman, 2008) and countries (Hanushek & Woessman, 2009). Moreover, recent moves to testbased accountability systems in the United States have made measures of student achievement
increasingly available to researchers (West et al., 2014).
At the same time, there is a growing body of research demonstrating that measures of
student non-cognitive skills—such as self-control and conscientiousness—are also predictive of
short- and long-run life outcomes (Almlund et al. 2011; Heckman & Kautz, 2012; Tangney,
Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). Furthermore, there has been a long-standing view in the United
States of the role of education in developing future citizens, in addition to positive economic
agents (Dewey, 1916; Gutmann, 2003). Taken together, these points suggest a need for school
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voucher evaluations to expand beyond measures of student achievement and attainment in
assessing program effectiveness. In the following sections, we review literature supporting the
importance of non-cognitive skills and civic engagement, as well as existing evidence of the
effectiveness of school choice programs in promoting these outcomes. In general, the literature
on the effects of voucher programs in developing these skills is quite limited; a finding which we
argue supports the importance of our work.
The importance of non-cognitive skills and the role of school choice in their development
While evidence indicates positive relationships between student academics and later life
outcomes (Heckman, 2008), recent empirical research has also demonstrated the important roles
other characteristics play in life outcomes. These skills fall under the broad classification of
“non-cognitive skills” in the economics literature, which West et al. (2014) note “has become a
catchall tem for traits of skills not captured by assessments of cognitive ability and knowledge.”
(p. 1) Many of these skills have been found to be linked to positive short- and long-run life
outcomes. For example, Tangney, Baumesiter, and Boone (2004) find in an analysis of college
students that measures of self-control are strongly related to college GPA, adjustment to college,
and better emotional responses to stressful situations. Conscientiousness, defined as strong
attention to detail and vigilance—has been found to be a strong predictor of school success and
attainment (Farkas, 2003; Lleras, 2008; Almlund et al. 2011), as well as future employment and
earnings (Farkas, 2003). In addition, Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) have found evidence
of negative relationships between non-cognitive skills and the likelihood of incarceration and
teenage pregnancy using data collected by the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY)
of 1979. Heckman and Kautz (2012) note that the positive relationships between life outcomes
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and non-cognitive skills are somewhat to be expected, given that traits like conscientiousness and
self-control tend to be particularly valuable in the workplace.
This evidence of the potential for positive economic returns to non-cognitive skills
development has recently captured the attention of policymakers, the media, and the general
public (Tough, 2012; Whitman, 2008). As West and colleagues (2014) note, policymakers and
practitioners are becoming increasingly interested in the development and use of measures of
student non-cognitive skills. Furthermore, while the malleability of non-cognitive skills is the
focus of contentious debate in the psychological literature (Almlund et al. 2011, Baumesiter,
Vohs, & Trice, 2007; Duckworth, Peterson, Matthews, & Kelly, 2007), studies have found that
different education environments may influence these character skills (Cunha & Heckman, 2008;
Dee & West, 2011; Jackson, 2012; West et al., 2014).
Unfortunately, the literature estimating the effects of school voucher programs on the
development of non-cognitive skills is very limited. Specifically, none of the existing
experimental evaluations of school vouchers have included a non-cognitive component in their
analysis beyond the proxies of high school attainment and college enrollment (Wolf et. al. 2013;
Cowen et al. 2013; Chingos & Peterson 2015; and Warren 2011). This lack of research is
somewhat surprising, given the specific emphasis placed by many private schools on discipline
(Figlio & Ludwig, 2012), explicit attempts at character building (Bryk, Lee, & Holland, 1993),
as well as existing evidence from longitudinal studies finding that private school attendance is
associated with significantly fewer risky behaviors on average (Figlio & Ludwig, 2012; Mocan
& Tekin, 2007).
While the literature on the effects of voucher programs on the development of noncognitive skills is essentially non-existent; a growing number of studies examining charter
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schools have included non-cognitive skills measures in their broader evaluation of program
effectiveness. In general, however, the findings from these studies suggest that charter schools
may harm the development of non-cognitive skills. For example, Dobbie and Fryer (2014), find
that students winning admission via lottery to the Promise Academy middle school in Harlem,
NY exhibited lower rates of self-esteem and “grit” relative to lottery losers—albeit only the latter
results were statistically significant. Furthermore, West and colleagues note a paradoxical
finding in their 2014 evaluation of Boston public and charter schools: student self-assessments of
non-cognitive skills are strongly and positively related to attendance, behaviors, and achievement
gains; however relationships at the school level are insignificant or negatively related to school
level measures. Furthermore, students attending high performing charter schools report
particularly low scores on non-cognitive skills measures. After providing a series of specification
checks, the authors argue that their results are likely driven by a reference group bias, whereby
students in more disciplined schooling environments may be holding themselves to higher
standards than students in other schools.32
In summary, the existing literature on non-cognitive skills development in schools of
choice is very limited. Among the 11 existing random assignment evaluations of school voucher
programs in the United States, none have examined how vouchers impact student non-cognitive
skills development. Furthermore, while existing evidence from charter school evaluations
suggest the potential for negative impacts, there is strong reason to believe that these results are
driven by school environment (West et al., 2014).33 Nevertheless, given increasing evidence of a

Dobbie and Fryer (2014) similarly hypothesized that such reference group bias could be
driving their negative results; however they do not investigate further.
33
This sentiment is shared by Tuttle and colleagues in their 2013 experimental evaluation of
KIPP middle schools. In particular, they find that students randomly admitted to KIPP via
oversubscription lotteries are more likely to report lying to their parents and losing their temper
32
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link between non-cognitive skills and positive life outcomes, as well as the explicit focus of
many private schools on such alternative educational outcomes, it is important to document the
development of non-cognitive skills in school choice evaluations. The present study, which
includes survey measures of non-cognitive skills, represents a first step in addressing this gap in
the school voucher literature.
Civic skills and school choice
Supporters of traditional public schools often argue that one of the primary benefits of
democratically governed education is that it can educate children to successfully promote our
democratic values (Dewey, 1916; Gutmann, 2003; Henig, 1999). For example, Amy Gutmann
(2003) claims “[a] central part of the historic mission of a democratically accredited school
system is to educate citizens who are capable of sitting on juries, assessing public proposals
(about schools, for example), exercising their rights, fulfilling their responsibilities, and seizing
their opportunities to live a good life as they see fit.” (p. 126) School choice, opponents argue,
will lead to a fractured system of education and will therefore fail to pass on our collective
values (Berliner & Biddle, 1996).
Wolf (2005) examines the evidence on the effects of school choice and civic values in a
systematic review, focusing on findings from experimental studies as well as rigorous quasiexperimental methods that approximate random assignment. In general, he notes that 20 studies
with 48 separate estimates of civic effects of private school choice meet his selection criteria. Of
the 48 total estimates, he finds only three indicating that private school choice negatively affects

in school while also being significantly more likely to complete their homework on time. The
authors note that these seemingly contradictory findings may be reflective of KIPP’s “no
excuses” school environment, which places a strong emphasis on school discipline and hard
work.
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civic values. In contrast, 29 findings (60 percent) are either positive or contingently positive.34 In
the present study, we focus exclusively on estimating differences in measures of political
tolerance between students awarded an LSP scholarship and those not receiving a scholarship.
As such, it is worth highlighting Wolf’s (2005) findings regarding private schooling and political
tolerance. Wolf includes seven studies estimating the effects of private school attendance on
political tolerance in his 2005 review. These studies were included because they either used
random assignment (Campbell, 2002; Howell & Peterson, 2002; Wolf, Peterson, & West, 2001)
or were published in peer-reviewed journals. In general, Wolf finds private school attendance
associated with higher levels of tolerance, although some studies found no difference between
public and private school students.35
In general, the evidence presented in this section indicates a large gap in the school
voucher literature, whereby none of the existing voucher evaluations have examined either noncognitive skills development or measures of civic engagement. This paper therefore aims to
provide a first attempt at addressing this gap in the literature by describing differences in
measures of non-cognitive skills and political tolerance among students who received and did not
receive an LSP scholarship in the first year of statewide expansion. The next section outlines the
methodology used to study these topics.
Methodology
This section introduces our methodology for investigating differences in non-cognitive
skills and political tolerance levels between students who were awarded and not awarded an LSP
in the 2012-13 school year. We begin by describing the phone survey data collection process and

Wolf (2005) categorizes a finding as contingently positive if it reports statistically significant
positive findings for a type of school rather than all schools.
35
Interestingly, one study found that attending a secular or Catholic private school was beneficial
but attending a non-Catholic religious school undermined political tolerance (Campbell, 2001)
34
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then move on to a description of the primary non-cognitive and tolerance measures used in this
study. The section concludes with description of the final sample of survey respondents as well
as a comparison of our sample to the full population of eligible applicants in the first year of the
program’s expansion statewide.
Data collection
Our study is based on the results of phone surveys of a selected subsample of the nearly
10,000 LSP eligible applicants in the first year of the program’s expansion statewide. After first
developing a survey incorporating several well-known scales designed to capture student noncognitive skills, our research team worked closely with an independent research group
specializing in phone survey administration to complete data collection. Data collection began on
November 18, 2014 and was concluded on February 7, 2015 after a total of 1,000 records were
collected.
Our research team provided the independent survey group with a randomly ordered list of
LSP eligible applicants that was divided into two strata. The first strata consisted of students who
received no exemptions in the LSP scholarship application process; whereas the second strata
included students who had participated in the New Orleans pilot program and students with
special education exemptions.36 These strata were ordered in the data to prioritize students who
were not subject to exemptions in the LSP award process and therefore were more likely to have
been randomly assigned to a scholarship placement in a private school or to the control group.

36

We excluded 159 students with severe disabilities from our call sample because their listed
disabilities likely precluded their participation in the phone survey. Specifically, we excluded the
following disability categories: Autism, Developmental Delay, Intellectual Disability (mild
through severe), and Multiple Disabilities.
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Upon contacting a household, surveyors first asked to speak with a parent or guardian to
verify they had reached the intended family, describe the purpose of the study, and request
consent to administer the survey to the child. After receiving consent, the surveyor asked to
speak with the child, verified that the child’s name matched the name on the intended record37,
and then administered the survey to the child38. In general, surveys lasted between 10 and 15
minutes. At the conclusion of the survey, the surveyor asked to speak again with the student’s
parent or guardian. The surveyor thanked the parent for their participation and provided the
family with a toll-free number to call in case the family had any additional questions about the
study.
Our final survey sample consists of 99939 students, two thirds of whom received an LSP
scholarship. This sample represents slightly more than 10 percent of the eligible applicants in the
2012-13 school year. These data have been merged with administrative data on student
achievement and demographics provided by the Louisiana Department of Education (LDE). In
addition, we have supplemented these data with information on school-level characteristics
publicly available through the National Center for Education Statistics’s Common Core of Data
(CCD) and Private School Universe Survey (PSUS).
Measures of non-cognitive skills and civic attitudes
This section describes four measures of non-cognitive skills and civic attitudes that are
the basis for our study. We have chosen the measures outlined in this section due to their use in

37

Several contacted households had more than one child in the LSP eligible applicant sample. In
order to preserve the random ordering of the call list, surveyors validated that the child was the
child of interest and explained to families that they may be receiving a call at a later point to
interview the other children in the household.
38
Parents were allowed to listen in as the survey was conducted if requested. Surveyors were
asked to identify such records in the collected data.
39
Our final analytical sample excludes one of the original 1,000 respondents because the child’s
guardian later contacted the research team and asked that the child be removed from the study.
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other studies of school choice. For example, Dobbie and Fyer (2014) and West and colleagues
(2014) have included the Grit scale in evaluations of the effects of charter school attendance on
student outcomes. Dobbie and Fryer (2014) additionally include the Locus-of-control and Selfesteem scales. Finally, the Political Tolerance scale described in this section has been used in
several studies of private schools (Wolf, 2005).
In addition, there are a few features of our design and implementation of the scales
described below which will likely add noise to our final results. For example, none of the scales
used in this study have been validated for phone surveys, nor have they been validated in
populations as young as the study sample. In addition, the research team made a small number of
changes to some of the survey items after consulting with the independent survey group to
improve language clarity.
Finally, items were randomly ordered within instruments across individuals in an attempt
to ensure that individual responses were not biased by the presentation order of questions.
These notes aside, we proceed to a description of the scales used in our analysis.
Grit. The first non-cognitive skill measured in this study is grit, or an individual’s
“perseverance and passion for long-term goals” (Duckworth et al., 2007). Our measure of grit is
based on the 8-item Short Grit Scale developed by Duckworth and Quinn (2012) that has been
adapted for young children.40 An individual’s grit score is based on their average responses to
eight five-point Likert scale items41 that include questions like “New ideas and projects
sometimes distract me from previous ones” and “I am a hard worker”.

The adapted 8-item grit scale is available on Dr. Duckworth’s website:
https://upenn.app.box.com/8itemgritchild
41
Students are asked to choose among the following options: “Very much like you”, “Mostly
like you”, “Somewhat like you”, “Not much like you”, and “Not like you at all”.
40
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Studies using different versions of the scale have found that grit is predictive of several
positive outcomes. Duckworth et al. (2007) find that grit is positively associated with career
stability in a sample of adults, positively related to GPA among undergraduates at an elite
Northeastern university, is a better predictor of retention among West Point first years than either
a measure of self-control or an assessment administered by West Point, and that individuals with
higher grit scores were more likely to outlast their competitors in the National Spelling Bee.
Furthermore, Duckworth and Quinn (2012) find that grit is positively related to student GPA,
independent of IQ. On the other hand, two recent studies using the Grit scale in evaluations of
charter schools have identified negative relationships between charter school attendance and Grit
(Dobbie & Fryer, 2014; West et al., 2014). Both studies note, however, that the negative
relationships may be driven in part by reference group bias resulting from differences in
individual schooling environments. The Grit scale has a .53 internal reliability score across our
whole sample, with a reported .52 for students in grades 2 through 6 and a reported .58 among
students in grades 7 through 12. This is substantially lower than the generally accepted threshold
of .75 for internal reliability scores (Croker & Aligna, 1986).
In a separate section appearing after the Grit scale items, we included a series of vignettes
describing fictitious individuals with different levels of Grit. While these vignettes have been
used by some to attempt to address reference group bias (King, Murray, Salomon, & Tandon,
2004; Zamarro, Vonkova, and DeBerg, 2014), we instead use individual responses to these
vignettes in a robustness check designed to determine if reference group bias is present in our
analysis.
Locus of Control. The second scale included in our survey is the locus of control scale
developed by Rotter (1966) which is designed to capture the extent to which an individual
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believes rewards are the result of their own actions. We record an individual’s locus of control
based on their responses to six four-point Likert scale items.42 The specific items are taken from
the High School and Beyond Third Follow-up (1986); and include questions like “Good luck is
more important than hard work for success” and “Every time I try to get ahead, something or
somebody stops me”. The Locus of Control scale has an internal reliability score of .47 across all
phone survey respondents, with a .44 among students in grades 2-6 and a .54 among students in
grades 7 through 12 at data collection.
Self-esteem. We capture individual self-esteem levels using Rosenberg’s (1965) popular
self-esteem scale. A respondent’s self-esteem score is calculated as their average response
across10 four-point Likert scale items. Each of the 10 items are designed to capture an
individual’s view of their self-worth; including questions like “I am able to do thinks as well as
most other people” and “I certainly feel useless at times”. In a 2003 review of studies using the
self-esteem scale, Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, and Vohs note that self-esteem is only
moderately related to school performance, is a strong predictor of individual happiness, is
associated with a stronger likelihood of speaking up in a group, among other findings. The
reported internal reliability score is .77 for the Self-esteem scale across all respondents, with a
.73 reported for students in grades 2 through 6 and a .83 reported for students in grades 7 through
12.
Political Tolerance. The final scale examined in this study attempts to capture
participant civic attitudes by providing a measure of their political tolerance. The political
tolerance protocol first asks individuals to identify a group that “has beliefs that [they] oppose
the most” and then asks a series of questions regarding the level of political freedoms the

Individuals are asked to select among four responses to each question: “Strongly Disagree”, “Disagree”, “Agree”,
“Strongly Agree”.
42
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individual would allow this group to enjoy. For example, individuals are asked to indicate if they
“Strongly Disagree”, “Disagree”, “[are] Neutral”, “Agree”, or “Strongly Agree” that “The
government should be able to secretly listen in on the telephone conversations” of their least
preferred group. Unlike the three previous scales, the political tolerance scale was only
administered to students without disabilities in grades 5 through 10 at baseline43 due to the
sensitive nature of the topic.44 In a 2005 review of the literature on private school choice and
civic outcomes, Patrick Wolf notes that several studies have used this scale to compare political
tolerance levels between public and private school students, largely finding higher levels of
tolerance among private school students. The internal reliability score for this scale for this group
of students is .77.
Sample Description
Data collection began in November of 2014 and continued for nearly four months until a
sample of 999 records were collected. This group of respondents, representing slightly more than
10 percent of all eligible LSP applicants in 2012, will provide the basis for our primary analysis.
It is important to recognize that comparisons presented in this paper rely on a selected sample,
based on the small number of families that opted into the phone survey. In particular, the small
response rate raises some concerns that our results may not be representative of the broader
population of eligible LSP applicants.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for several student characteristics collected at
baseline for two groups of students: the students responding to our phone survey and all other

43

These students should be in grades 7 through 12 as the time of survey administration unless
they were held back during the time period examined.
44
In addition, the phone survey included a prompt before and during the questions noting, "If
you are at all uncomfortable answering any of these questions, you may choose not to answer.
That is completely ok."
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eligible LSP applicants in 2012-13. The data presented in Table 1 is based either on student
characteristics collected in the 2011-12 school year or from their application.45
In general, the results presented in Table 1 do not suggest that the phone survey sample
differs strongly from the population of eligible applicants. The survey respondent sample is
slightly less likely to be African American and to be identified as Free- or Reduced-Price Lunch
eligible relative to the population of eligible LSP applicants. In addition, survey respondents
were slightly more likely to have applied for the program in third grade and slightly less likely to
have applied in either seventh or eighth grade. The remaining differences, including those
observed among students with achievement data in 2011-12, are fairly negligible. In particular,
while students in both groups on average scored below the state average in all subjects, the two
groups do not differ strongly in their observed performance. While there is no way to determine
if the students differ from the general population of eligible applicants on unobservable
dimensions, the similarly of the distributions presented in Table 1 suggests that such selection
bias may not be a major concern for our analysis.

Student grade, for example, were collected from a student’s application--we would roughly
expect these students to be two grades higher at the time of the survey if they were admitted to
the grade applied for and progressed at a normal pace through grades. FRL and achievement data
are only available for students in grades 3-7 who took either the iLEAP or LEAP exams. Finally,
small percentage of students is missing data required to identify if they were living in a
metropolitan statistical area at the time of application.
45
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Table 1
Comparison of characteristics at baseline across multiple samples
Phone
Other
survey
eligible
Diff.
Std. Err.
sample
applicants
N Mean
N
Mean
Female
999 0.53
8,530 0.50
0.02
0.02
African American
999 0.84
8,530 0.87 -0.03**
0.01
White
999 0.09
8,530 0.08
0.01
0.01
Hispanic
999 0.03
8,530 0.02
0.01
0.01
a
Free- or reduced-price lunch eligible
356 0.78
3,395 0.82
-0.04*
0.02
Living in Metropolitan Statistical Areab 921 0.96
7,588 0.96
0.00
0.01
School preferences listed
999 1.97
8,530 2.06
-0.09*
0.04
Grade at application
Kindergarten
999 0.21
8,530 0.21
0.00
0.01
First
999 0.14
8,530 0.13
0.01
0.01
Second
999 0.11
8,530 0.11
0.01
0.01
Third
999 0.14
8,530 0.11 0.04***
0.01
Fourth
999 0.09
8,530 0.10
-0.01
0.01
Fifth
999 0.09
8,530 0.08
0.01
0.01
Sixth
999 0.09
8,530 0.08
0.00
0.01
Seventh
999 0.05
8,530 0.08 -0.03***
0.01
Eighth
999 0.04
8,530 0.05 -0.01**
0.01
Ninth
999 0.04
8,530 0.05
-0.01
0.01
Tenth
999 0.02
8,530 0.02
0.00
0.00
Standardized state achievementc
Math
355 -0.51
3,330 -0.52
0.00
0.05
ELA
356 -0.45
3,328 -0.43
-0.02
0.05
Science
355 -0.54
3,322 -0.55
0.01
0.06
Social Studies
355 -0.46
3,322 -0.47
0.01
0.06
*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10
a.
Student FRL status is only available for students appearing in the state’s testing data.
b.
Data on Metropolitan Statistical Area is taken from the American Community Survey.
c.
Student achievement data are restricted to students taking the standard state assessments (iLEAP or LEAP) in
grades 3 through 7 in the 2011-12 school year.
Note. Student achievement data has been standardized within subject and grade to the state’s testing distribution.
Source: Authors’ calculations.

Results and Discussion
In the following sections, we present the primary results from our analyses examining
differences in measures of student non-cognitive skills and political tolerance; as well as a series
of checks designed to investigate the robustness of our results. In general, the evidence presented
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here largely suggests that the two groups of students did not differ across any of the four
measures of interest two years after initial LSP scholarship assignment.
Primary observational analysis
Table 2 presents pairwise correlations between the three non-cognitive skills measures,
tolerance measure, and four estimates capturing student achievement growth between the 201112 and 2012-13 school years.46 Panel A presents results for the full set of respondents with
complete responses for all measures, excluding Political Tolerance; while Panel B presents
results for a subset of students who additionally provided responses for the Political Tolerance
scale.47 We include achievement scores gains in Table 1 to examine the relationship between the
included non-cognitive skills measures and student achievement gains; however in doing so, we
have substantially restricted the sample for which we can estimate these relationships.
Nevertheless, the relationships observed in Table 1 among the non-cognitive skills measures
generally hold in the full sample of survey respondents.
In both Panel A and Panel B, the group of non-cognitive skills measures are strongly correlated
with one another, as are the group of achievement gains measures. On the other hand, the two
groups—non-cognitive skills and achievement gains—are not strongly correlated. These findings
corroborate the work of West et al. (2014), who found significant, but very weak relationships
between Grit and math and ELA achievement gains. Interestingly, Political Tolerance does not
appear to be related to either Grit or Self-esteem (Panel B); but is significantly and positively
related to Locus of Control.

46

Keeping in line with the work of West and colleagues (2014), we calculate mean performance
gain as the average residual resulting from a regression of standardized achievement in 2012-13
on a cubic function of achievement in 2011-12.
47
Due to the sensitive nature of the items on the Political Tolerance survey, we only
administered the scale to students in grades 7 through 12 in the fall of 2014 who did not indicate
a disability on their original LSP application.
68

Table 2
Correlation matrices of non-cognitive skills, tolerance, and achievement growth measures, by age group
Locus of
Political
Res. math
Res. ELA
Grit
Self-esteem
Control
Tolerance
gain
gain
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Panel A: Phone survey sample with complete responses (N=229)
Locus of Control
0.43***
Self-esteem
0.37***
0.53***
Political Tolerance
------Res. math gain
-0.02
-0.02
-0.03
Res. ELA gain
0.06
0.08
0.05
--0.46***
Res. science gain
0.04
0.00
-0.02
--0.30***
Res. social studies gain
0.09
-0.07
-0.03
--0.27***
Panel B: Including political tolerance (N=177)
Locus of Control
0.47***
Self-esteem
0.34***
0.56***
Political Tolerance
-0.04
0.17**
0.09
Res. math gain
-0.07
-0.05
-0.09
0.03
Res. ELA gain
0.09
0.09
0.06
0.02
0.40***
Res. science gain
0.10
0.07
-0.05
-0.03
0.28***
Res. social studies gain
0.06
-0.06
-0.05
-0.11
0.21***
*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10
Note. Samples restricted to students with complete responses across all measures.
Source. Authors’ calculations.

Res. science
gain

0.44***
0.39***

0.31***

0.39***
0.42***

0.32***

Before moving on to more complex analysis, it is helpful to examine the raw distributions
of our measures between students awarded an LSP scholarship and those not awarded to get a
sense of how the two groups compare. Figure 1 separately plots kernel density estimates of the
distributions for each of our four measures for students awarded and not awarded an LSP in
2012-13. While the plots in Figure 1 do not control for student demographics and achievement,
they are nevertheless informative. In particular, the similarity between the two distributions in
each graph is quite striking, suggesting little differences between the two groups. This is
confirmed by Kolmogrov-Smirnov tests, which fail to reject the null of similar distributions in
each case (Grit: p = .29; Locus of Control: p = .35; Self-esteem: p = .41; Political Tolerance: p =
.55).
In general, the results presented in Figure 1 do not suggest strong differences in noncognitive skills and political tolerance between the two groups of students after two years of
potential program participation. Nevertheless, these findings are based on simple comparisons
between the two groups. Next, we examine whether the null findings presented in Figure 1
persist when controlling for observational differences between the two groups using multiple
regression analysis.
Tables 3 and 4 present results of regression models designed to improve model precision
by controlling for various baseline characteristics. Table 3 presents results for models focusing
on Grit and Locus of Control and Table 4 presents models focusing on Self-esteem and Political
Tolerance. In both tables, columns 1 and 4 present simple models analogous to the distributional
analysis presented in Figure 1. Columns 2 and 5 include controls for student demographics along
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Figure 1. Kernel density estimated distributions of non-cognitive skills and tolerance measures
comparing students receiving an LSP scholarship and those who did not receive a scholarship.
with fixed effects for grade and the number of school preferences offered at application.48
Columns 3 and 6 additionally include controls for student math and ELA achievement in the
2011-12 school year. These analyses are limited to the subset of students in our sample who took
either the Louisiana LEAP or iLEAP exam in grades 3 through 7 in that year.
In general, the results presented in Tables 3 and 4 suggest limited differences between
students receiving and not receiving an LSP scholarship on all measures. Even after controlling
for several baseline covariates, the general story of insignificant differences between the two

48

Families could offer up to 5 school preferences on their application. In order to control for
unobservable differences between families offering more or fewer school preferences, we
include the total number of choices offered as a vector of dummy variables.
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groups suggested in Figure 1 persists. At the same time, it is important to note that the results
presented in Tables 3 and 4 are quite noisy. The reported standard errors--especially for the LSP
award identifier--are fairly large across all models, typically equal in magnitude to the coefficient
estimate itself. Similarly, while overall model precision generally improves with the inclusion of
additional covariates, all models perform quite poorly in parsing away error variance as none of
the adjusted R-squared values surpass .09. While we expected somewhat noisy results, given the
lack of studies validating the included scales via phone surveys or in samples of children as
young as some of those included in our sample, the results presented in Tables 3 and 4 do not
give us strong confidence in these models.
Finally, an examination of the estimated coefficients for the baseline covariates in Tables
3 and 4 reveals some interesting relationships in our sample. For example, females report higher
levels of GRIT, but do not differ substantially from males on the remaining measures. Moving in
the last two years is associated with lower levels of Grit and Self-esteem, but higher levels of
Political Tolerance. Finally, student achievement has little predictive value for the set of noncognitive skills measures; however students with higher baseline math achievement appear to be
less tolerant than other students and students with higher baseline ELA achievement appear to be
relatively more tolerant.
In summary, the results presented in this section do not suggest that students awarded an
LSP scholarship differed from students who did not receive a scholarship on measures of noncognitive skills and political tolerance two years later. These results hold both in sample
comparisons of scholarship receipt status, as well as in more complex analyses controlling for
several covariates collected at baseline.
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Table 3
Regression adjusted relationships between Grit and Locus of Control and LSP scholarship
receipt
GRIT
Locus of Control
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
LSP Awarded
0.04
-0.02
0.01
0.06
0.04
0.04
(0.04) (0.05)
(0.07)
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
Female
0.14***
0.06
0.00
-0.05
(0.04)
(0.07)
(0.04) (0.06)
Black
0.09
0.31
0.24* 0.41*
(0.10)
(0.27)
(0.13) (0.24)
White
-0.11
-0.14
0.17
0.15
(0.12)
(0.30)
(0.15) (0.25)
Hispanic
0.27*
0.31
0.33** 0.48
(0.15)
(0.32)
(0.17) (0.29)
Special Ed
-0.23** -0.69***
-0.11 -0.16
(0.11)
(0.18)
(0.10) (0.19)
Moved
-0.10**
-0.10
0.03
0.09
(0.05)
(0.09)
(0.04) (0.07)
Mom's education
Finished high school
0.12
-0.11
-0.03 -0.10
(0.11)
(0.15)
(0.11) (0.10)
Went to college but did not finish
0.21*
-0.05
0.12
0.07
(0.11)
(0.15)
(0.11) (0.10)
Finished college
0.18
-0.08
0.05
0.08
(0.11)
(0.15)
(0.11) (0.10)
Std. math achievement, 2011-12
0.05
0.05
(0.05)
(0.05)
Std. ELA achievement, 2011-12
0.02
0.07
(0.05)
(0.05)
Grade FE
X
X
X
X
Choices offered FE
X
X
X
X
N
999
924
330
999
924
330
Adj. R-squared
0.00
0.04
0.06
0.00
0.04
0.09
*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10
Note. Math and ELA achievement has been standardized to the state testing distribution by grade for students taking
the iLEAP or LEAP exams in grades 3 through 7 in 2011-12. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are presented
in parentheses.
Source. Authors’ calculations.
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Table 4
Regression adjusted relationships between Self-esteem and Political Tolerance and LSP
scholarship receipt
Self-esteem
Political Tolerance
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
LSP Awarded
0.03
-0.03
0.00
0.08
0.05
0.11
(0.03) (0.04)
(0.05)
(0.09) (0.11) (0.13)
Female
0.02
0.01
-0.05
-0.12
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.10) (0.11)
Black
0.13*
0.25*
0.05
0.06
(0.07)
(0.13)
(0.16) (0.25)
White
0.03
0.06
-0.19
-0.07
(0.09)
(0.15)
(0.23) (0.31)
Hispanic
0.21** 0.39**
-0.06
-0.03
(0.09)
(0.16)
(0.44) (0.47)
Special Ed
-0.15* -0.26**
(0.08)
(0.11)
Moved
-0.09**
0.00
0.18*
0.13
(0.04)
(0.06)
(0.11) (0.11)
Mom's education
Finished high school
0.00
0.00
-0.12
-0.17
(0.08)
(0.11)
(0.17) (0.22)
Went to college but did not finish
0.07
0.06
-0.18
-0.23
(0.07)
(0.11)
(0.16) (0.21)
Finished college
0.06
0.18*
0.00
-0.01
(0.07)
(0.10)
(0.15) (0.20)
Std. Math
0.04
-0.25***
(0.04)
(0.08)
Std. Math
-0.02
0.25***
(0.04)
(0.09)
Grade FE
X
X
X
X
Choices offered FE
X
X
X
X
N
999
924
330
247
238
211
Adj. R-squared
0.00
0.08
0.09
0.00 -0.01
0.04
*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10
Note. Math and ELA achievement has been standardized to the state testing distribution by grade for students taking
the iLEAP or LEAP exams in grades 3 through 7 in 2011-12. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are presented
in parentheses.
Source. Authors’ calculations.
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Robustness checks
The results presented thus far suggest that receiving an LSP scholarship was not related
to student non-cognitive skills and levels of political tolerance among students participating in
the first year of the program’s statewide implementation. In this section, we present two analyses
designed to check the robustness of our findings. First, we examine if the estimated relationships
hold in the subsample of students whose scholarship award was determined by binding
lotteries.49 Next we investigate the extent to which reference group bias may be present in our
Grit scale results. In general, we find limited evidence of different results in our subsample of
LSP applicants participating in binding lotteries as well as little evidence suggesting response
bias is of concern in our study.
Focusing on subsample of phone survey respondents who participated in binding
lotteries. Our first robustness check examines if the null results identified in the observational
analyses presented in the preceding section hold among a subsample of phone survey
participants whose LSP scholarship award was determined by a binding lottery. As is detailed in
Chapter 1, LSP scholarships were awarded to students through a matching algorithm designed to
take into account student school preferences as well as a set of priorities established by the
Louisiana Department of Education (LDE). While all students were subject to the matching
algorithm, LSP scholarships were only awarded by lottery in cases when there were more
students applying in the same priority category than seats available to the same grade in the same
school. Thus, as a first check of the robustness of the null results presented in Tables 3 and 4, we
examine the extent to which these findings persist in the subsample of eligible applicants
participating in binding lotteries. By focusing on binding lotteries, we will be limiting our

49

See Chapter 1 for a detailed description of the LSP scholarship award process.
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sample; however we will be providing a better control for unmeasurable factors driving selection
into private schooling. While we should not expect to find substantially different results in this
group, such a finding would raise concerns regarding our primary analyses.
Our focus on binding lotteries requires a change in the model used to estimate differences
in students receiving and not receiving an LSP scholarship. Specifically, we employ a similar
two-stage least squares (2SLS) model to that presented in Chapter 1 which allows an estimation
of the effect of LSP usage on the non-cognitive skill and tolerance measures of interest. In
particular, we first predict the likelihood that a student enrolls in a private school using their LSP
scholarship lottery outcome as a predictor along with a series of controls for demographics,
baseline achievement, and individual risk set. This predicted usage variable is used as a
substitute for observed usage in a model predicting one of the given dependent variables: Grit,
Locus of Control, Self-esteem, and Political Tolerance. The specific 2SLS model is:

1.

𝐸𝑖 = ∑𝜋𝑗 𝑅𝑗𝑖 + 𝛿𝑇𝑖 + 𝑿𝜷 + 𝑨𝝆 + 𝑢𝑖

2.

𝑌𝑖 = ∑𝛼𝑗 𝑅𝑗𝑖 + 𝜏𝐸̂𝑖 + 𝑿𝜸 + 𝑨𝜽 + 𝜖𝑖

Where:


R is a fixed effect for a student’s first choice school lottery or “risk set”



E is a variable indicating if a student used an LSP scholarship to enroll in a private school



T is a variable indicating if a student received an LSP scholarship to their first choice
school



Y is one of the four outcome measures of interest in this study: Grit, Locus of Control,
Self-esteem, and Political Tolerance
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X is a vector of student demographics50



A is a vector of variables capturing student achievement in 2011-1251
Table 5 presents the results of the 2SLS estimations of the differences between LSP

scholarship users and other students on our non-cognitive skills and political tolerance measures.
Column 1 presents results for simple models that only include risk set fixed effects; column 2
provides the results from specifications that additionally control for student demographics; and
column 3 presents results for models additionally controlling for student baseline achievement.
The latter models are restricted to the subset of students who took the Louisiana state
assessments in grades 3 through 7 in 2011-12. Across all models, the results from first stage
regressions suggest winning an LSP scholarship is highly predictive of use: LSP winners, on
average, are over .85 percentage points more likely to enroll in a private school across all
models; and the reported joint-F statistics meet Staiger and Stock’s (1997) recommended
threshold of 10.
The results presented in Table 5 do not strongly differ from those presented in Tables 3
and 4: students using an LSP scholarship to their first choice school do not differ for the most
part from other students in nearly every model. The lone exception is that we find that LSP
scholarship users on average report significantly higher scores on the Locus of Control scale in a
model accounting for lotteries, student demographics, and student baseline achievement scores.
This finding is somewhat surprising, given the overall insignificant results observed for the
companion model presented in Table 4.
Table 5
50

Demographic controls include gender, race/ethnicity, an indicator of student mobility,
mother’s education, and variables capturing the number of school preferences offered at
application.
51
Regressions including student achievement are restricted to students who took the iLEAP or
LEAP exam in math and ELA in grades 3 through 7 in 2011-12.
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Student-level relationships between non-cognitive skills and tolerance and LSP scholarship
receipt in binding lotteries
without covariates
Dependent Variable
(1)
Grit
0.05
(0.09)
Locus of Control
0.04
(0.08)
Self-esteem
-0.06
(0.07)
Model summary
N
639
Risk sets
280
First stage joint F
974.3
Political tolerance

N
Risk sets
First stage joint F

+ demographic controls
(2)
-0.02
(0.09)
0.03
(0.08)
-0.09
(0.08)

+ student achievement
(3)
0.12
(0.16)
0.18*
(0.11)
-0.02
(0.12)

587
264
78.6

202
105
23.8

0.00
(0.20)

-0.08
(0.23)

-0.03
(0.27)

157
83
229.3

150
79
17.9

136
76
16.4

*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10
Note. All models include risk set fixed effects. Across all models, winning an LSP scholarship is highly predictive of
use: all estimated coefficients on LSP awarded are over .85 and have reported p-values of less than .001.
Source. Authors’ calculations

There are at least two reasons for this discrepancy. First, it is important to note that the
focus on binding lotteries, in addition to the requirement of baseline achievement data in the
model in question, restricts the sample on which this result is based (sample size of 202
compared to a sample size of 330 in the primary analysis). In addition, it is important to
recognize that the results presented in Table 5 are based on local average treatment effects—or
the estimated effects of LSP usage for those students whose treatment assignment influences
their take up. In contrast, the observational analyses presented in Table 3 estimate relationships
based on the mere scholarship award outcome. Nevertheless, while these points may explain the
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significant finding for Locus of Control, the generally insignificant results presented in Table 5
generally corroborate the insignificant findings presented in Tables 3 and 4.
Reference group bias and the Grit scale. Two recent analyses of charter schools
(Dobbie & Fryer, 2014; West et al., 2014) have provided evidence suggesting that observed
differences in levels of Grit among charter school students may be explained by students facing
school environments with higher behavioral expectations. In both cases, reference group bias
was motivated by divergent findings between the included non-cognitive skills measures and
other positive outcomes.52 In contrast, our results largely suggest insignificant differences
between the two groups of students after two years. It is possible, however, that reference group
bias has potentially played a role in the observed findings: with a positive or negative shift
occurring that may exactly offset any gains or losses associated with the program. While this
seems unlikely, we explore this possibility in regards to Grit.
King et al. (2004) note that reference group bias has long been an important issue facing
survey data. In particular, individuals in different groups may potentially respond differently to
the same set of questions because their group-based experiences have led them to comprehend
the same question in different ways. Naumann and John (2013), for example, compare
conscientiousness ratings with undergraduate GPAs in a sample of Anglo-American and AsianAmerican undergraduates at UC Berkley. In general, they find Anglo-American undergraduates
reporting significantly higher conscientiousness scores than Asian-American students while also
posting lower GPAs on average; however this relationship disappears when the researchers asked

52

Dobbie and Fryer (2014), for example, find large positive effect estimates for achievement and
significant negative findings on the Grit scale. West et al. (2014), find positive relationships
between student level measures of Grit and achievement that do not appear at the school level.
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students to compare themselves to an explicit reference group (eg: "a typical Asian-American
student").
We incorporated a series of vignettes designed to capture the construct of Grit in our
survey in order to explore the extent to which reference bias could be an issue in our study.53
Specifically, survey participants were asked to respond if the individual in the following
vignettes was “Very much like [the participant]”, “Mostly like [the participant]”, “Somewhat like
[the participant]”, “Not much like [the participant]”, or “Not like [the participant] at all”:
1. Collin almost never finishes his homework. He stops working on a problem to watch TV
or to play with his friends. How much like you is Collin?
2. Riley always gets his homework done, even if he has to stay up late or avoid playing with
his friends. He even spends a lot of time trying to answer hard questions that confuse
him. How much like you is Riley?
By asking individuals the extent to which they self-identified with the vignettes, we are
unable to use these responses as anchors in an attempt to address selection bias (King et al.,
2004). On the other hand, by examining the distribution of responses to these vignettes between
students who received an LSP and those who did not, we can use their responses to establish the
extent to which reference bias may be an issue in our study. For example, if we were to find LSP
awardees with low Grit scores tend to strongly identify with Collin (least gritty) while students
who do not win a scholarship tend not to identify with Collin, there would be evidence
suggesting that the two groups are judging themselves according to different standards. More
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In their 2004 paper, King and colleagues develop a method to address potential reference
group bias by using individual responses to a series of vignettes on the topic to adjust an
individual’s responses to account for their differing environments. As the authors note, “the idea
is to recode the categorical self-assessment relative to the set of vignettes.” (p. 195) This method
is growing in popularity among researchers administering surveys across many groups of
individuals (Zamarro, Vonkova, & DeBerg, 2015).
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generally, large differences in distributions of responses to these vignettes between LSP
receivers and non-receivers with similar Grit scores would be indicative of reference group bias.
Table 6 compares the distribution of responses between LSP scholarship receivers and nonreceivers for the most and least gritty survey respondents. Panel A focuses on the least gritty
students—or those in the bottom quartile of observed Grit scores—and Panel B focuses on the
most gritty students—those in the top quartile of Grit scores. For each group, we present the
distribution of responses to the “least gritty” vignette (Collin) and the “most gritty” vignette
(Riley). Differences in the response distributions between the students receiving and not
receiving LSP scholarships would provide evidence suggestive of a response bias effect. In
contrast, we observe little evidence of divergent distributions in Table 6.
The distributions in Panel B (student with the highest Grit scores) for the most part are
shifted in the expected direction: both groups of students strongly identify with Riley (most
gritty) and rarely identify with Collin (least gritty). The distributions for students with the lowest
reported Grit scores, in contrast, are relatively flatter. Somewhat surprisingly, a large percentage
of both LSP awardees and non-awardees indicate that they are very unlike Collin (least gritty).
This potentially highlights the need to be wary of social desirability bias when examining survey
response data (Paulhus, 1991). Nevertheless, the most important feature of Table 6 is that the
distributions of responses between students who received an LSP scholarship and those who did
not receive a scholarship do not differ strongly across all models. This is confirmed with Chisquare tests of distributional independence, which fail to reject the null hypotheses in almost
every case. The lone exception for responses to the least gritty vignette (Collin) students with the
lowest Grit scores, in which the null of independence is rejected at the 5 percent confidence level

82

Table 6
Distribution of responses to vignettes among top and bottom quartile of LSP scholarship awardees and non-awardees
Vignette

LSP status

N

Collin - Least Gritty

Not awarded LSP
Awarded LSP

53
150

Riley - Most Gritty

Not awarded LSP
Awarded LSP

53
150

83

Collin - Least Gritty
Riley - Most Gritty

Not awarded LSP
Awarded LSP

74
188

Not awarded LSP
Awarded LSP

74
188

"Very much
"Mostly
like me"
like me"
(1)
(2)
Panel A: Bottom Grit quartile
25%
8%
11%
11%
26%
33%

17%
23%

Panel B: Top Grit quartile
1%
0%
1%
0%
72%
68%

12%
15%

"Somewhat
like me"
(3)

"Not much
like me"
(4)

"Not like me
at all"
(5)

21%
23%

17%
8%

30%
47%

32%
24%

8%
7%

17%
13%

8%
7%

11%
7%

80%
86%

15%
9%

1%
3%

0%
6%

Note. Chi-square tests of independence of distributions fail to reject the null hypothesis in all but one case: students scoring in the bottom Grit quartile responses
to the least gritty vignette (Collin) are significantly different at the 5 percent level (𝜒 2 (4)=11.5, p = .02).
Source. Authors’ calculations.

(𝜒 2 (4)=11.5, p = .02). Thus, while other studies have suggested that reference group bias may
influence survey-based measures of student non-cognitive skills, we find little evidence that our
earlier analyses suffer from such bias in our data.
Conclusion
The results presented in this paper represent the first attempt to examine differences in
non-cognitive skills and political tolerance in a private school voucher program. In general, our
findings do not suggest that students who were awarded an LSP scholarship differed
significantly from students who did not receive a scholarship award two years after initial
assignment on scales measuring individual Grit, Locus of Control, Self-esteem, and Political
Tolerance. These findings are robust to several alternative specifications; and we furthermore
find little evidence suggestive of reference group bias.
This research comes at an important time for the evaluation of educational interventions.
Non-cognitive measures are increasingly being used in education evaluations (Dobbie & Fryer,
2014; Tough, 2012; West et al. 2014); however researchers continue to recommend caution in
expanding their use in policy evaluation citing the possibility of reference bias and other issues
that may produce misleading results (Dobbie & Fryer, 2014; Duckworth & Yaeger, 2015; West
et al. 2014). While we do not find strong evidence of reference group bias in our results, we
nevertheless highlight several caveats that should be taken into account when analyzing our
findings. First, it is important to note that these findings are based on a subset of individuals
volunteering to participate in the phone survey, ultimately representing little more than 10
percent of eligible applicants in 2012. While we present evidence indicating that survey
participants do not differ strongly from the full population of LSP applicants, we cannot rule out
that our sample differs from other program participants on unobservable dimensions. Second,
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and perhaps most importantly, we again note that the scales used in this analysis have been
validated neither for use in a phone survey nor in samples of children as young as some of those
included in our survey. As we argue in the results section, these factors likely play a non-trivial
role in the relatively large amounts of noise observed in our models.
Nevertheless, we believe this paper advances the knowledgebase on the effects of private
school choice programs on participating students by providing the first comparison of noncognitive skills and political tolerance measures in a school voucher program. With a growing
research base demonstrating the important role of non-cognitive skills in lifelong outcomes, as
well as a long standing view of the important role of education in developing civic skills, it is
important for future evaluations of choice programs to explore outcomes beyond achievement
and attainment. At the same time, we caution future researchers to take into account the potential
threats to analysis of survey response bias, reference group bias, and issues that may inflate error
variance into their evaluation design.
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Chapter 354
Effects of the Arkansas Academic Challenge Scholarship on College Outcomes

Introduction
In February 2010, President Obama argued for a shift in focus in the reauthorization of
the ESEA towards a K-12 education system geared at ensuring career- and college-readiness
(The White House, 2010). More recently, President Obama has set a vision for America to have
the highest proportion of college graduates in the world by 2020.55 This focus on college success
is merited, as economists Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz (2008) argue that America’s higher
education system has played a pivotal role in America’s emergence as one of the leading
economies in the world. A number of policies have been developed over the last half-century to
increase college access and success. These policies include federal aid programs such as the GI
Bill for military veterans and the Pell Grant program for low-income families.
Enrollment in higher education and degree completion has dramatically increased
recently. According to the US Department of Education, the percentage of 18- to 24-year-olds
enrolled in a degree-granting institution has increased from 36 percent in 2001 to 41 percent in
2012 (Snyder, 2014). Meanwhile, the percentage of 25-to 29-year-olds who have earned at least
a bachelor’s degree has increased from 28 percent in 2003 to 34 percent in 2013 (National Center
for Education Statistics, 2014).
Nevertheless, while college access and graduation rates have improved over the last halfcentury, these improvements have not been experienced equally among all segments of the

54
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This paper was co-authored with Albert Cheng.
Source: The White House. Available: http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/education/highereducation/building-american-skills-through-community-colleges
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population. Disparities along demographic characteristics such as income and race remain. A
recent Pell Institute (2015) report found that while the college access gap between the richest and
poorest American families has dropped significantly since the 1970s, there remains a sizeable
gap in bachelor’s degree completion. Specifically, while over 90 percent of students entering
colleges from the highest income families completed a 4-year degree, only 21 percent of lowincome family college entrants completed college in 2012. Likewise, by 2013, 40 percent of
White 25- to 29-year olds have earned at least a bachelor’s degree. Yet only 21 and 16 percent of
their Black and Hispanic counterparts have done the same.
A number of policies aim to improve both the rate at which individuals attend college and
the rate of successful completion. For example, recent research suggests that simple “nudges”
can improve the rate at which individuals matriculate and persist in college. Castleman and Page
(2013) find that college intending high school graduates randomly assigned to receive text
message reminders of important college enrollment deadlines were significantly more likely to
matriculate in college than their counterparts who did not receive the texts. Similarly, Castleman
and Page (2014) find that freshman at two-year community colleges who were randomly
assigned to receive text messages reminding them about renewing their financial aid were
significantly more likely to remain enrolled through their sophomore year of college. In addition,
Bettinger, Long, Oreopoulos, and Sanbonmatsu (2012) found that students of families randomly
assigned assistance in completing a FAFSA application were more likely to attend and persist in
college than students in families who did not receive assistance. Nevertheless, while these
studies suggest simple nudges may be effective, the most prevalent policy aimed at increasing
college access and success is financial aid.
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Financial aid for higher education can work to improve college attendance by reducing
the cost of college (Dynarski, 2008). Indeed, the cost of higher education has significantly risen
over the past decade. In constant 2011-2012 dollars, the price for tuition, room, and board at
public four-year institutions increased from $12,000 in 2001 to $17,000 to 2011. Prices for
private four-year institutions rose from $29,000 to $34,000 over the same period (National
Center for Education Statistics, 2014). Unsurprisingly, over 80 percent of students in four-year
institutions between 2008 and 2012 reported receiving some type of financial aid (National
Center for Education Statistics, 2014).
Aid can take several forms, but the most prevalent are loans and grants (College Board,
2013). Whereas loans provide funds upfront for later payments, grant aid represents a direct
financial subsidy from the perspective of the recipient (College Board, 2013). In the 2012-13
school year, Federal loans and grants accounted for 61 percent of total aid received by
undergraduate students. Institutional grants constituted another 19 percent of total aid received.
In contrast, state grants accounted for only 5% of total aid (College Board, 2013). The majority
of grant aid has a need-based component (over 70%), but several states have grant aid programs
with eligibility requirements largely linked to student performance on standardized college
readiness assessments and high school performance. In this paper, we examine the effectiveness
of one such program, the Arkansas Academic Challenge Scholarship (ACS), in improving
student outcomes in college.
As Cornwell, Lee, and Mustard (2005) note, there are at least three motivations for states
to offer merit-aid programs: (1) increasing college enrollment, (2) incentivizing high performing
high schoolers to stay in state, and (3) promoting and rewarding academic achievement.
Regarding the latter point, Scott-Clayton (2012) notes that merit scholarships could improve
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student outcomes through two channels. First, by reducing the cost of college access, merit
scholarships could help to minimize non-academic stresses in students’ lives which could then
translate into higher achievement. Second, merit-scholarships may improve outcomes by directly
incentivizing students to maximize behaviors that are associated with college success. For
example, ACS requires students to maintain a GPA of 2.5 while enrolling in at least 15 credit
hours a semester in order to continue qualifying for the program. Such requirements may
incentivize individuals at the margin to work harder to meet their GPA requirements in order to
continue receiving ACS. As of 2012, 14 states offered merit-based scholarships with eligibility
requirements covering a large portion of high school graduates (Scott-Clayton, 2012). This
number does not include state programs with more rigorous academic requirements—such as
Missouri’s Bright Flight scholarship which provides scholarships to the top 3 percent of ACT
test takers in the state.
While state financed merit-aid programs have been around since the 1980s, these
programs largely came under empirical scrutiny in the early 2000s due to the increased
availability of administrative data. Largely relying on empirical techniques exploiting abrupt
policy changes or strong institutional knowledge of program award mechanisms, researchers
have found such programs to improve the likelihood of college attendance (Cornwell, Mustard,
and Sridhar, 2006; Dynarski, 2003; Kane, 2003; Scott-Clayton, 2012), persistence (Bettinger,
2004), cumulative GPA (Scott-Clayton, 2012), and likelihood of graduation (Dynarski, 2008;
Scott-Clayton, 2012). At the same time, research examining these programs has not reported
consistently positive findings. For example, Cornwell, Lee, and Mustard (2005) find a decreased
likelihood of taking a full-time course load and an increased likelihood in enrollment in summer
school classes, both among entering freshman, as students attempted to navigate the Georgia
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HOPE scholarship program. In addition, while Scott-Clayton (2012) finds that West Virginia’s
PROMISE scholarship positively influenced entrance and graduation rates, she finds no
significant impacts on four-year college persistence. Finally, several studies have found that the
positive effects of state-funded merit-aid programs are largely concentrated around the
programs’ eligibility thresholds (Cornwell, Lee, and Mustard, 2005; Scott-Clayton, 2012).
This paper follows in the vein of prior studies utilizing knowledge of the assignment
policy to examine the effects of the Arkansas Academic Challenge Scholarship (ACS) on student
outcomes. Specifically, we use administrative data on current college students who became
eligible for the ACS because of their academic credentials to estimate the effects of receiving the
scholarship on short- and long-term college outcomes via regression discontinuity design. This
study contributes to the literature on state-based merit scholarships for three reasons. First, while
prior research has largely focused on the effects of merit-aid programs on entering freshman, we
examine how receipt of the ACS affected college outcomes for students who were currently
enrolled in college at the introduction of the program (hereafter referred to as “current students”).
While we intend to examine the effects of the ACS on student outcomes for entering freshman
cohorts in future iterations of this research, the current paper nevertheless adds to the literature
by providing insight into how merit-aid policies affect students in the short-run. In addition, by
focusing on students who were currently enrolled in college at the time of the program's
expansion, as opposed to incoming Freshman, our study represents the first attempt to estimate
the motivational effects of a merit-aid scholarship on student outcomes that is unaffected by any
motivational effects occurring prior to enrollment in college.56 Second, and perhaps most
importantly, this paper compliments exiting research by focusing on a program with relatively
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For example, the mere existence of merit-aid scholarships may incentivize students to work
harder in high school to meet the program eligibility requirements (Dynarski, 2004).
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low eligibility requirements. In particular, while other programs impose eligibility requirements
covering up to 40 percent of in-state college enrollees (Scott-Clayton, 2012), the students
maintaining a 2.5 cumulative college GPA and continuously enrolled are eligible for the ACS
scholarship. Finally, given the mixed findings of exiting research on state-financed merit-aid, our
analysis benefits the literature by examining the effects of such programs in a new state and
program context.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the following section, we provide a
more detailed description of the Arkansas Academic Challenge Scholarship. Next, we outline the
quasi-experimental strategy and data we use to estimate the effects of the ACS on college
outcomes. We then move on to our primary findings and a series of robustness checks. Finally,
we conclude with a discussion of our findings and their implications.
The Arkansas Academic Challenge Scholarship
In November of 2008, Arkansas voters approved the first statewide lottery in Arkansas:
the Arkansas Scholarship Lottery. Proceeds from the lottery were used to dramatically expand
the existing Arkansas Academic Challenge Scholarship Program. Arkansas Scholarship Lottery
tickets first went on sale in the fall of 2009; and the first round of lottery-funded scholarships
were awarded to students in the fall of 2010 (Arkansas Department of Higher Education, 2010).
The goal of the ACS is “to provide meaningful financial help to those qualifying”
(Arkansas Secretary of State, 2011). When the program was first enacted, the ACS provided
relatively generous scholarships of $5,000 to students attending 4-year colleges.57 As is shown in
Table 1, the award amounts have changed over time to account for changing revenue streams for

For comparison: the published tuition for the University of Arkansas-Fayetteville—the state’s
flagship institution-was $5,010 in the 2010-11 school year (source: National Center for
Education Statistics, Integrated Postsecondary Education Data Systems (IPEDS):
http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/).
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the lottery and the increasing application rate in recent years. To date, the Arkansas Scholarship
Lottery has funded scholarships for over 130,000 Arkansas residents to attend 2- or 4-year
colleges.58
Table 1
ACS award payouts by cohort year
Year First Awarded
2010-11
2011-12
2012-13
2013-14
2013-14
2013-14
2013-14

4 Year School
$5000
$4500
$4500
$2000 (1st year)
$3000 (2nd year)
$4000 (3rd year)
$5000 (4th year)

2 Year School
$2500
$2250
$2250
$2000
$2000
$2000
$2000

Source: Arkansas Department of Higher Education (http://scholarships.adhe.edu/scholarships-and-programs/a-z)

At its inception—and the period under scrutiny in this analysis—there were three
categories of students eligible for the ACS.
1. Students who received the ACS prior to the fall of 2010 (“Prior Recipients”)
2. First-time freshman entering college in the fall of 2010 or afterwards (“Traditional
Recipients”)
3. Students who entered college before the fall of 2010 as first-time freshman who were
continuously enrolled in consecutive semesters prior to the fall of 2010 (“Current
Achiever Recipients”)
In this paper, we focus on estimating the impacts of ACS on college outcomes for the
final category of eligible students: Current Achievers. To be eligible for the ACS, Current
Achievers had to satisfy several requirements. First, they had to fill out a Free Application for
Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) application. Second, they had to be continuously enrolled for at
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Source: http://myarkansaslottery.com/about/scholarships
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least 12 hours each semester since their freshman year. Finally, Current Achievers had to have a
cumulative GPA of 2.5 at the time of their application for the program. As we describe in the
following section, we leverage detailed data on students at a large Arkansas university during
this time period as well as knowledge of the strict eligibility requirements for students to
examine the effects of the ACS on Current Achiever college outcomes using a regression
discontinuity design.
While our analysis focuses on the final category of students, it is important to point out
that the requirements for Traditional Recipients of the ACS are particularly low among statebased merit scholarships. In particular, Traditional Recipients must [a] complete a FAFSA, [b]
have a high school GPA of 2.5 or higher, and [c] scored a 19 or higher on the ACT (or achieved
an equivalent score on another college readiness assessment) (Arkansas Secretary of State,
2011). In the future, we intend to expand on the current analysis by examining the effects of
ACS receipt on students around these relatively low performance thresholds.
Method
Our goal is to estimate the impacts of receiving the Arkansas Academic Challenge
Scholarship (ACS) on college-going outcomes for students who were currently enrolled in
college during the expansion of the program in the fall of 2010. As Dynarski (2008) notes, it is
generally challenging to estimate the causal effects of financial aid on college enrollment,
persistence, and attainment because of the likely unobservable factors influencing these
outcomes. Fortunately, ACS’s strict eligibility criteria for Current Achievers—full-time
enrollment and cumulative GPA of 2.5—allows us to estimate the causal impact of the program
on students near the eligibility thresholds. Specifically, we estimate ACS impacts by utilizing
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knowledge of the program’s eligibility requirements in a regression discontinuity design (Kane,
2003; Scott-Clayton, 2012; van der Klaauw, 2002).
In this section, we describe the data and analytical strategy used to estimate ACS impacts
on college outcomes. In addition, we provide initial graphical analyses supporting our RDD
method.
Before moving on to a description of our data and analytical strategy, it is important to
highlight the following points. First, while the ACS uses strict eligibility requirements to allocate
scholarships, students were still required to apply for an ACS. Thus, we estimate ACS impacts
using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design (FRDD) by first predicting the likelihood of
receiving an ACS given one’s eligibility status. Second, while the dual eligibility requirements
allow for comparisons of several types of ACS receivers and non-receivers, our primary analysis
focuses exclusively on a comparison of individuals who have met the full-time enrollment
qualification.
Data
We estimate the impacts of the ACS on college outcomes using detailed administrative
data on students at a large Arkansas university (LAU). These data include student level
demographics, high school qualifications, information on credit accumulation, cumulative GPA,
and major by semester, and family financial data.
While our data include information on all students enrolled at LAU by freshman cohortyear, our analysis examines a restricted sample of students. First, because we are interested in
ACS impacts on Current Achievers, we focus on students entering as freshman in years 2007-08
through 2009-10. Students in these cohorts would be entering their senior, junior, and sophomore
years when the ACS was expanded by the lottery scholarship in the fall of 2010-11. Second, we
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restrict our analysis to students identified as applying to LAU from within Arkansas as out-ofstate applicants are not eligible for the scholarship. Finally, we restrict our sample to students
who filled out a FAFSA at the time of their initial application because, while the ACS does not
have a set income threshold, students are still required to submit a FAFSA to be eligible for the
program.59 After making these selections, we are left with an analytical sample comprising 331
students from cohort year 2007-08, 464 from cohort year 2008-09, and 745 from cohort year
2009-10.
Analytical strategy
This section introduces our analytical strategy for estimating the effects of the Arkansas
Academic Challenge Scholarship on college outcomes. Our broad goal is to utilize the eligibility
requirements of the ACS to estimate the program’s impact on Current Achievers—or students
who were already enrolled at LAU in the fall of 2010. In this section, we describe the particular
comparison group used to estimate the ACS’s effects, outline the fuzzy regression discontinuity
model used to estimate those effects, and describe the specific sample under scrutiny in our
analysis.
Selecting a comparison group. The ACS eligibility criteria for Current Achievers are
suggestive of a dual discontinuity in qualification status. Specifically, Current Achievers are
eligible for the ACS if they met the continuing full-time enrollment requirement (enrolled at least
12 hours in each semester since their initial matriculation) and the cumulative GPA requirement
(2.5 GPA). The dual nature of the ACS eligibility requirements suggests at least three potential
comparison groups for ACS recipients. Specifically, one can compare ACS qualifiers to (1)
students satisfying the GPA requirement but who failed to meet the credit hours requirement, (2)
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We identify students as having filled out a FAFSA if their record indicates an expected family
contribution. These data are populated by LAU using FAFSA data.
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students satisfying the credit hours requirement but who did not meet the GPA requirement, and
(3) students who did not meet either requirement.60
These potential comparison groups are displayed in Figure 1, which graphs individual
credit hours earned in the spring semester of 201061—the last semester before the expansion of
the ACS—and cumulative GPA at the end of the spring semester for in-state enrollees who had
completed a FAFSA and were continuously enrolled at LAU since their initial matriculation.
There are three types of LAU students presented in Figure 1: individuals who did not receive the
ACS (blue crosses), individuals who received the ACS (red circles), and individuals who had
received an earlier version of the ACS at any point in their college career (small black circles).
While our analysis could potentially examine each of the three comparisons outlined above, we
instead focus on comparison (2): students satisfying the credit hours requirement who failed to
meet the GPA requirement. This comparison is highlighted with a black box in Figure 1. We
have chosen this comparison because, while credit hours may appear to be a continuous variable,
it is at best an ordinal variable when we restrict our analysis to a small band around the credit
hour cutoff. This violates the continuity requirement of assignment variables in an RDD (Imbens
& Leimux, 2008). Thus, our estimates of the effects of the ACS on college outcomes will be
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As Reardon and Robinson (2012) note, one can accomplish the final comparison by combining
the two continuous assignment variables into a single continuous variable using a Euclidean
distance transformation. For the purposes of our analysis, we could use the variable
𝑑𝑖 = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑐𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑖 )√𝑐𝐺𝑃𝐴2𝑖 + 𝑐𝐻𝑟𝑠𝑖2 , where cGPA is the ACS GPA requirement centered at the
cutoff score of 2.5 and cHrs is the credit hour requirement centered at 12 hours.
61
The ACS required Current Achievers to be continuously enrolled full-time (12 hours) in every
semester prior to the fall of 2010. The sample presented in Figure 1 has first been restricted to
only those individuals who have met the continual enrollment requirement in every semester
before the spring of 2010. This allows us to effectively turn the continual enrollment requirement
into a single continuous variable: credit hours earned in the spring of 2010.
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driven by a comparison of individuals meeting the ACS credit hours requirements with
cumulative GPAs within a small range around 2.5 points.62

Figure 1. Dual eligibility requirements for the ACS. Current Achievers qualifying for the ACS
had to have at least 12 credit hours and a cumulative GPA of 2.5 in the semester prior to the
introduction of the ACS. This figure highlights the dual nature of the ACS eligibility
requirements. The black box depicts the comparison under study in this analysis: individuals near
the pre-ACS GPA threshold who have satisfied the credit hours requirement.
Before moving on, there are several important points to make about Figure 1. First, while
they constitute a small portion of the data, prior ACS recipients (small black circles) are clearly
represented in the sample presented in Figure 1. As we describe later, our analytical models
control for these individuals using a dummy variable indicating if an individual ever received an
ACS prior to the 2010-11 expansion. Second, there are a small number of individuals who
received the ACS scholarship in the fall of 2010 who appear to have only met one of the two
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Previous RDD studies of the effects of financial aid on students have similarly examined
impacts while conditioning on one or more assignment variables (ie: Kane, 2003; Scott-Clayton,
2012).
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eligibility requirements. While our fuzzy regression discontinuity will partially account for these
individuals in the first stage of our instrumental variables model, it is important to note that these
individuals highlight potential issues with our current assignment variables.63 As such, we would
like to stress that the findings presented here are preliminary and should be taken with caution.
The fuzzy regression discontinuity model. Our analytical strategy is to leverage our
knowledge of the ASC eligibility criteria to examine the effects of the program on Current
Achievers via a regression discontinuity design. This technique has been commonly used in
papers examining the effects of financial aid on college enrollment (Kane, 2003; Scott-Clayton,
2012; van der Klaauw, 2002) and outcomes (Scott-Clayton, 2012). Nevertheless, while ACS
eligibility is determined by well-defined cutoffs, it is not generally true that ACS receipt is solely
a function of one’s qualification status. Specifically, although students may meet each of the
eligibility requirements outlined above, it is not guaranteed that all qualifying students will
actually apply for the program. As such, we identify the impact of the ACS on students using a
fuzzy regression discontinuity design in which we predict ACS receipt using one’s qualification
status.
Specifically, we employ the following two-stage least squares (2SLS) model to estimate
the effects of ACS using predicted—rather than observed—ACS receipt as our independent
variable of interest:
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Only five individuals who do not meet both qualifications but nevertheless received an ACS
scholarship make it in to our final analytical sample. We have tested the extent to which these
observations influence the results presented in Tables 4 through 6—our primary ACS effect
estimates—by re-running the models while excluding these observations. In all cases, the
estimated coefficients are in the same direction, but in a small number of cases, removal of these
observations nudges the coefficients estimates over the statistically significant threshold. In
general, however, the estimates are not substantially different and we therefore conclude that
inclusion of these observations is not problematic for our estimation.
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1. 𝑅𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑦𝑖 + 𝑓(𝑐𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑖 )′𝑐 + 𝑓(𝑐𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑖 𝑥𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑦𝑖 )′ 𝑑 + 𝑋𝑖 ′𝑔 + 𝑒𝑖
2. 𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑅̂𝑖 + 𝑓(𝑐𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑖 )′ 𝛿1 + 𝑓(𝑐𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑖 𝑥𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑦𝑖 )′ 𝛿2 + 𝑋𝑖 ′𝛾 + 𝜖𝑖
where 𝑅𝑖 indicates observed ACS receipt, Qualifyi indicates if an individual qualifies for ACS,
𝑓(. ) is a second-order polynomial function of the centered pre-ACS GPA assignment variable
(cGPA), and 𝑋 is a vector of demographic control variables capturing student gender, ethnicity,
and financial resources. As was described in the previous section, all models first condition on
having met the ACS credit hours requirement of 12 hours. If one’s qualification status
successfully predicts the probability that they take up a scholarship and our model sufficiently
captures the underlying relationship between the assignment variable and our outcomes of
interest and qualification status, then the parameter estimate on 𝑅̂𝑖 represents the causal effect of
receiving an ACS for those individuals near the assignment variable’s threshold.
Outcome variables of interest. We are interested in estimating the impact of receiving the
ACS on both short- and long-term college outcomes. In particular, we are interested in two broad
categories of outcomes: measures collected after one year of program participation and measures
collected at the end-of-college. We briefly describe the seven measures we use to capture these
outcomes here.
GPA after 1 year. Our first outcome measure is a student’s cumulative GPA at the end of
the spring semester of 2011. While we refer to this variable as “GPA after 1 year”, it actually
reflects one’s GPA after two semesters of program participation. Following Scott-Clayton
(2012), we impute for missing values of GPA in this semester using previously observed
cumulative GPA values for the student.
Likelihood of persisting 1 year. We identify a student as having persisted 1 year in
college if they are still enrolled in the spring semester of 2011. Because this is a binary variable,
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we estimate the effects of ACS on student persistence using instrumental variables in a probit
specification.
Credit hours accumulated after 1 year. We calculated credit hours accumulated as the
difference between one’s credit hours earned at the end of the 2011 spring semester and their
credit hours accumulated at the end of the 2010 spring semester. As with GPA, we impute for
missing credit hour values using credit hours accumulated in earlier semesters.
Credit hours accumulated after 2 years. As an intermediary step between our year 1
outcomes and our end-of-college outcomes, we examine the effects of the ACS on student credit
hour accumulation after two years of ACS availability. This variable is calculated as the
difference between one’s credit hours accumulated at the end of the 2012 spring semester and
their hours accumulated in the spring of 2010. Students entering college in the fall semester of
2007—the oldest cohort in our data—are expected to be starting their fourth year of college in
the fall of 2010. Analyses examining the effects of the ACS on credit hour accumulation after
two years will exclude these students because there is no expectation that they will still be
enrolled at LAU two years after the fall of 2010.
Final GPA. In addition to examining one’s GPA after one year of ACS availability, we
estimate the impact of ACS receipt on a student’s last-observed GPA. As with the short-run GPA
measure, we impute for missing values of GPA using earlier observed values (Scott-Clayton,
2012).
Likelihood of graduating within 4 and 5 years. Our final two outcome measures
estimate the impact of ACS receipt on graduating within four and five years. These are binary
variables collected from LAU’s administrative data indicating if a student received a diploma by
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their 9th or 11th semester64, respectively. As with persistence, we estimate the effects of ACS
receipt on these measures using instrumental variables with a probit specification to account for
the variables’ binary nature.
Figure 2 provides a first look at how ACS qualification is related to our outcome
variables of interest. Specifically, Figure 2 presents graphs of simple regressions of the seven
outcome measures against cumulative GPA in the spring of 2010 (hereafter pre-ACS GPA),
which has been centered at the ACS cutoff of 2.5 GPA points. All models condition on meeting
the ACS credit hours requirement and control for the underlying relationship between outcomes
and pre-ACS GPA using a quadratic specification—the same specification that we employ in our
primary analytical models. In addition, the graphs are restricted to a pre-ACS GPAs ranging
between 2.2 and 2.8 points (or a band of 0.30 GPA points). Because ACS qualification does not
perfectly predict receipt, these graphs represent intent-to-treat estimates.65
The results presented in Figure 2 provide some evidence suggesting negative impacts on
persistence, credit hour accumulation, and the likelihood that one graduates within 4 and 5 years.
On the other hand, the graphs for both GPA measures do not reflect strong ACS impacts. Finally,
it is important to note that the data presented in these graphs are quite noisy—especially for the
binary outcomes of interest. While our more sophisticated regression models will help to address
some of this noise using control variables, we nevertheless want to again highlight the need for
applying caution when interpreting our results.
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Analyses focusing on the probability of graduating within 5 years exclude students in the
2009-10 cohort because we cannot observe this outcome for these students as our data end in
2013-14.
65
The difference between receipt and qualification suggests that one can get a good
approximation of the treatment-on-treated impact estimates by dividing the intent-to-treat
estimates by 0.40.
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Figure 2. Outcome variables by centered pre-ACS GPA assignment variable, conditional on meeting the ACS hours requirement.
All graphs employ a quadratic specification for the assignment variable and are restricted to our primary analytical range of 2.20
to 2.50 pre-ACS GPA points.
Source: Authors’ calculations.

Density of pre-ACS GPA assignment variable. As a last check of our regression
discontinuity specification, we examine in Figure 3 the distribution of our pre-ACS GPA
assignment variable in the 2007-08, 2008-09, and 2009-10 LAU cohorts. Specifically, Figure 3
presents the density of individuals within .05 GPA point bins to the left and right of the 2.5 point
cutoff. Ideally, one would examine a relatively smooth density to the left and right of the cutoff;
as a discontinuous density is suggestive of gaming of the assignment variable (Imbens &
Lemieux, 2008; Scott-Clayton, 2012). Unfortunately, the results presented in Figure 3 indicate a
relatively large increase in the grouping of individuals scoring at or slightly above a 2.5 in the
spring of 2010. This is largely accounted for by nine students with cumulative GPAs exactly
equaling 2.5 (seven in the 2009-10 cohort and 2 in the 2008-09 cohort). This discontinuous jump
in pre-ACS GPA to the right of the performance threshold may indicate that students worked
harder in the spring of 2010 to increase their GPAs in order to meet the ACS requirements.
Nevertheless, while such gaming would be problematic for our analysis, we believe this is
unlikely to be a problem as the ACS eligibility requirements were officially passed in April,
2010, leaving little opportunity for students to strategically manipulate their GPAs (Arkansas
Department of Higher Education, 2010). In short, the discontinuity observed in Figure 3 likely
represents a random distortion in the data rather than individual gaming.
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Figure 3. Graph of density by Centered pre-ACS GPA assignment variable with kernel density
overlay. Bins represent .05 GPA point gaps. All individuals have met the ACS hours threshold.
Source. Authors’ calculations.

Sample
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for three groups of students for a number of
demographic characteristics. The first three columns of Table 2 present data for our primary
analytical sample: students entering LAU in the 2007-08, 2008-09, and 2009-10 school years
that had applied from within the state of Arkansas, had submitted a FAFSA application, met the
ACS credit hours requirement, and had pre-ACS GPAs ranging between 2.2 and 2.8 GPA points.
The next three columns (“Relaxed GPA and Hours Requirements”) represent all in-state
applicants in the 2007-08 through 2009-10 cohort years who submitted a FAFSA application.
The final three columns (“Relaxed Residency Requirement”) present descriptive data for all
applicants who submitted a FAFSA, independent of their original state of residence.
In general, the students included in our analytical sample are slightly more likely to be
Black, slightly less likely to have a parent who attended college, and have lower pre-college
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Descriptive statistics for our analytical sample and other comparison groups
Relaxed GPA and Hours
Analytical Sample
Requirements
N
Mean
SD
N
Mean
SD
Male
321
0.53
0.50
3430
0.50
0.50
Ethnicity
Black
321
0.13
0.33
3430
0.09
0.28
Hispanic
321
0.06
0.23
3430
0.04
0.20
White
321
0.76
0.43
3430
0.80
0.40
Other
321
0.24
0.43
3430
0.20
0.40
Parent went to college
321
0.53
0.50
3425
0.57
0.49
High School GPA
321
3.38
0.33
3429
3.56
0.42
ACT Composite
320
23.65
3.14
3419
25.50
3.91
Expected Family Contribution Percentile
0-24
321
0.30
0.46
3430
0.27
0.44
25-49
321
0.33
0.47
3430
0.30
0.46
50-74
321
0.17
0.38
3430
0.19
0.40
75-100
321
0.20
0.40
3430
0.24
0.43
Cohort Year
2007-08
321
0.17
0.37
3430
0.31
0.46
2008-09
321
0.32
0.47
3430
0.34
0.48
2009-10
321
0.51
0.50
3430
0.34
0.48

Relaxed Residency
Requirement
N
Mean
SD
5310
0.49
0.50
5310
5310
5310
5310
5303
5308
5290

0.08
0.04
0.80
0.20
0.63
3.58
25.59

0.27
0.20
0.40
0.40
0.48
0.42
3.85

5310
5310
5310
5310

0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25

0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43

5310
5310
5310

0.31
0.35
0.35

0.46
0.48
0.48

Note. Individuals included in the analytical sample have submitted a FAFSA, applied to LAU from within Arkansas, met the ACS credit hours requirement of 12
hours, and had a pre-ACS cumulative GPA between 2.20 and 2.80 GPA points.
Source. Authors’ calculations.

academic credentials on average. In addition, students in our analytical sample tend to have
lower expected family contribution (EFC) values—a variable indicating the expected amount of
school tuition a family’s income can support—than students in the other groups. Finally, it is
important to note that younger individuals (those from the 2009-10 cohort) compose a relatively
larger portion of the sample. This is not particularly surprising, as more students in the older
cohort have had more opportunities to leave LAU and more opportunities to fail to qualify due to
the continual enrollment requirement. Nevertheless, it is important to note that this younger
cohort composes a larger portion of our sample.66
Results
In this section, we present the preliminary estimates of the effects of the Academic
Challenge Scholarship on college outcomes for students near the program’s GPA eligibility
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requirements. In general, our results suggest the scholarship had limited impacts on Current
Achiever GPA after one year, persistence likelihood, and credit accumulation after both one and
two years. On the other hand, ACS recipients appear to have a significantly lower final GPA and
likelihood of graduating within four years relative to non-recipients. Nevertheless, ACS
recipients appear to catch up to non-recipients over time, as our models indicate insignificant
differences in the probability of graduating within five years. In the following sections, we
present the results from our preliminary analyses along with several specification tests examining
the robustness of our results.
Primary RDD Analysis
As discussed above, we estimate the effects of the ACS on college outcomes using a
fuzzy regression discontinuity design. In particular, we are using one’s qualification status to
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We include a moderator analysis examining if ACS effects are differentially experienced
among the cohorts as a specification check.
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first predict ACS receipt in a two-stage least squares (2SLS) framework; and then using this
predicted likelihood of receipt to estimate the impact of the scholarship on student outcomes.
Before moving on to our primary results, we present in Table 3 the results for first stage
regressions using ACS qualification to predict scholarship receipt. Columns 1-4 present results
for our preferred pre-ACS GPA band of .30 GPA points67 (or GPAs ranging between 2.2 and 2.8
points), with model specifications increasing in complexity as one moves from left to right in
Table 3. Columns 5 and 6 present results from fully specified models employing larger and
smaller pre-ACS GPA bands which are used to check the stability of our results in a following
section.
In general, the results presented in Table 3 suggest that ACS qualification is a relevant
predictor of ACS receipt, with take-up probabilities ranging between 30 and 40 percentage
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points. In addition, we note that the first stage joint F-statistics are greater than 10 in models
presented in columns 1 through 5, satisfying Staiger and Stock’s (1997) recommended threshold
for instrumental variable relevance. The final model, which relies on a smaller pre-ACS GPA
band (.20)—and therefore a smaller sample—does not meet this threshold. We therefore again
recommend caution when interpreting these results.

67

After visually inspecting the data, we chose .30 as our pre-ACS GPA bandwidth because it
provided a sufficiently large sample with which to estimate effects while also allowing for us to
restrict our estimates to a small distance from the ACS GPA cutoff.
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Table 3
First Stage Regression Results
Qualify for ACS
Controls
Student demographics
Family income
Observations
Joint F-Statistic
R-squared
ACS GPA Band

(1)
0.32**
(0.10)

(2)
0.40***
(0.09)

(3)
0.31**
(0.08)

(4)
0.38***
(0.09)

(5)
0.36***
(0.05)

(6)
0.40***
(0.09)

X
322
12.21
0.26
0.30

X
X
321
12.64
0.30
0.30

X
X
451
20.71
0.29
0.40

X
X
205
7.50
0.25
0.20

X
322
15.86
0.24
0.30

321
16.31
0.29
0.30

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering of individuals in major. All models include controls for
entering cohort year, pre-ACS hours below 15 hours, and quadratic functions of the assignment variable, centered
pre-ACS GPA.
Source. Authors’ calculations.

The models presented in Table 4 examine the effects of ACS receipt on student
cumulative GPA and likelihood of persisting one year after ACS receipt. The parameter
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estimates for the persistence models (columns 5 through 8) represent marginal probabilities
estimated at mean values for the included covariates. In general, the results presented in Table 4
suggest that ACS receipt has statistically insignificant, yet positive, effects on Current Achievers
after one year. Specifically, our preferred models—which include demographic and financial
background control variables—suggest that ACS recipients scored on average .13 GPA points
higher than their counterparts after one year and were 5 percentage points more likely to be
enrolled at LAU after one year. Nevertheless, the relatively large standard errors presented in
Table 4 indicate that we cannot state with confidence that the true effect estimate differs from
zero.
Table 5 presents results for models estimating the ACS effects on credit hour
accumulation after one (columns 1-4) and two years (columns 5-8). The latter analyses are
restricted to the 2008-09 and 2009-10 cohorts because the 2007-08 cohort are expected to be in
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Table 4
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RD Estimated ACS Effects on GPA and Likelihood of Persisting One Year After Receipt
Outcome: Year 1 GPA
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.12
0.15
0.11
0.13
Predicted ACS Receipt
(0.12)
(0.13)
(0.10)
(0.11)
-0.04**
-0.04**
Male
(0.02)
(0.01)
-0.03
-0.01
Black
(0.06)
(0.07)
0.07
0.09
Hispanic
(0.11)
(0.11)
-0.09
-0.10
Other race
(0.06)
(0.07)
0.00
0.01
Parent attended college
(0.04)
(0.04)
EFC Percentile
-0.11***
-0.10***
: 25-49
(0.03)
(0.02)
EFC Percentile
-0.09*
-0.11***
: 50-74
(0.05)
(0.03)
EFC Percentile
0.01
-0.01
: 75-100
(0.04)
(0.05)
0.01
0.02
Prior ACS recipient
(0.03)
(0.03)
N
322
321
322
321
ACS GPA Band
.30
.30
.30
.30

Outcome: Pr(Persist 1 Year)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
0.00
0.07
-0.02
0.05
(0.22)
(0.19)
(0.25)
(0.20)
-0.01
-0.01
(0.03)
(0.04)
-0.59**
-0.53***
(0.25)
(0.19)
-0.61***
-0.55***
(0.23)
(0.16)
0.58**
0.53***
(0.23)
(0.17)
0.04
0.03
(0.02)
(0.03)
-0.03
-0.02
(0.03)
(0.02)
0.03
0.01
(0.06)
(0.05)
0.01
-0.01
(0.03)
(0.02)
0.04
0.02
(0.04)
(0.03)
322
321
322
321
0.30
0.30
0.30
0.30

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering of individuals in major. All models include controls for entering cohort year, pre-ACS hours below 15
hours, and quadratic functions of the assignment variable, centered pre-ACS GPA. See Table A1 for remaining coefficient estimates.
Source. Authors’ calculations.

Table 5
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RD Estimated ACS Effects on Credit Hour Accumulation After Receipt
Outcome: 1 Year Credit Accumulation
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
-6.42
-3.59
-7.47
-4.72
Predicted ACS Receipt
(13.86)
(11.50)
(15.56)
(13.69)
-0.93
-0.99
Male
(1.04)
(1.30)
1.20
1.74
Black
(3.74)
(4.52)
-0.74
-0.32
Hispanic
(2.60)
(3.19)
-1.21
-1.34
Other race
(3.04)
(3.46)
1.43
1.41
Parent attended college
(1.20)
(1.11)
EFC Percentile
-1.61
-1.68*
: 25-49
(1.26)
(0.98)
EFC Percentile
0.96
-0.23
: 50-74
(3.64)
(3.03)
EFC Percentile
1.33
0.59
: 75-100
(2.35)
(2.01)
1.49
1.03
Prior ACS recipient
(2.09)
(1.96)
N
322
321
322
321
ACS GPA Band
0.30
0.30
0.30
0.30

Outcome: 2 Year Credit Accumulation
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
-8.39
-6.35
-10.16
-8.38
(13.09)
(12.30)
(15.60)
(15.61)
-0.90
-1.02
(0.92)
(1.28)
3.75
4.61
(4.57)
(5.90)
2.14
3.06
(4.35)
(5.80)
-3.63
-4.29
(3.85)
(4.81)
1.48
1.90
(1.62)
(1.81)
1.41
0.72
(1.73)
(1.62)
0.97
-0.38
(3.50)
(3.17)
-0.89
-0.87
(1.66)
(1.34)
2.00
1.94
(2.05)
(2.45)
251
251
251
251
.30
.30
.30
.30

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering of individuals in major. All models include controls for entering cohort year, pre-ACS hours below 15
hours, and quadratic functions of the assignment variable, centered pre-ACS GPA. See Table A1 for remaining coefficient estimates.
Source. Authors’ calculations.

their fourth year when they could receive the expanded ACS and are therefore less likely to
persist for two years. In contrast to the results presented in Table 4, the credit accumulation
models suggest that ACS recipients earned fewer credit hours—roughly five fewer hours over a
two semester period and nine fewer hours over a four semester period. Nevertheless, as before,
all effect estimates are not statistically significant.
Finally, Table 6 presents ACS effect estimates for three end-of-college outcomes: final
GPA, likelihood of graduating within four years, and likelihood of graduating within five years.
While the results in Tables 4 and 5 are all statistically insignificant, ACS recipients appear to
score about a quarter of a GPA point lower than non-recipients at the end of their college career
and are significantly less likely to graduate within four years. While the latter estimates are
particularly large—suggesting ACS recipients are 50 percentage points less likely to graduate
within four years—they do align with the simple graphical analysis presented in Figure 2. On the
other hand, ACS recipients appear to catch up to their counterparts by their fifth year in college,
as the effect estimates presented in columns 9 through 12 are statistically insignificant. It is
important to note, however, that the 2009-10 cohort cannot contribute to the latter findings due to
data limitations. We explore the extent to which the 2009-10 cohort is driving the other observed
findings in the following section.
In summary, the results presented in Tables 4 through 6 suggest that Current Achievers
receiving the ACS do not look significantly different than their counterparts after one year, but
have significantly lower final GPAs and likelihood of graduating within four years. At the same
time, ACS recipients are no less likely to graduate within five years. In the following section, we
examine the extent to which our results stand up against two robustness checks.
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Table 6
RD Estimated ACS Effects on End-of-College Outcomes

Pred. ACS
Receipt

Outcome: Final GPA
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.31** 0.25** -0.31* -0.26*
(0.15)

(0.10)

Black
Hispanic
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Other race
Parent att.
college
EFC Percentile
: 25-49
EFC Percentile
: 50-74
EFC Percentile
: 75-100
Prior ACS
recipient
N
ACS GPA
Band

(0.18)

(0.13)

0.07**
(0.03)
0.01
(0.09)
0.09
(0.06)

-0.03
(0.03)
0.03
(0.11)
0.19
(0.16)
-0.18*
(0.10)
0.09*
(0.05)
0.05**
(0.02)
-0.05
(0.08)
0.06
(0.05)
0.04
(0.05)
321

322

.30

0.30

-0.04
(0.02)
0.02
(0.09)
0.17
(0.14)
-0.17*
(0.09)
0.08
(0.05)

Male

Outcome: Pr(Grad. in 4 years)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
0.54*** 0.51*** 0.56*** 0.53***

322

321

0.04
(0.04)
322

.30

.30

.30

(0.05)

(0.06)

(0.04)

-0.01
(0.04)
0.12*
(0.07)
-0.08
(0.15)
-0.07*
(0.04)
0.08*
(0.04)

(0.07)

Outcome: Pr(Grad. in 5 years)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
0.17
(0.34
)

-0.01
(0.05)
0.13
(0.09)
-0.05
(0.15)
-0.07
(0.05)
0.06
(0.05)

0.27

-0.08

0.08

(0.23)
0.12*
*
(0.06)
-0.23
(0.14)
-0.35
(0.26)
0.17
(0.13)
-0.04
(0.07)

(0.33)

(0.30)

-0.04
(0.07)
0.11*
(0.07)
0.09
(0.06)

-0.04
(0.07)
0.08
(0.09)
0.07
(0.06)

321

0.07***
(0.02)
322

0.05
(0.03)
321

159

158

-0.07
(0.09)
0.14
(0.15)
0.03
(0.11)
0.18*
*
(0.08)
159

0.30

0.30

0.30

0.30

0.30

0.30

0.12*
(0.07)
-0.21
(0.23)
-0.39
(0.28)
0.18
(0.19)
-0.02
(0.07)
0.11*
(0.06)
0.05
(0.18)
-0.02
(0.07)
0.14
(0.08)
158
0.30

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering of individuals in major. All models include controls for entering cohort year, pre-ACS hours below 15
hours, and quadratic functions of the assignment variable, centered pre-ACS GPA. See Table A2 for remaining coefficient estimates.
Source. Authors’ calculations.
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Specification Checks
In this section, we present several checks of our results. We begin by expanding our
analytical sample by relaxing some of the requirements for ACS qualification in order to increase
the statistical power of our analysis. Next, we examine the extent to which our results are
sensitive to varying pre-ACS GPA bandwidths. Two following analyses examine the extent to
which model misspecification may be driving our primary results. Finally, we provide a
robustness check in which we attempt to estimate ACS effects using earlier LAU cohorts for
whom the Arkansas scholarship lottery financed expansion of the ACS was unavailable. It would
be problematic for our analysis if we find that ACS receipt positively predicts college outcomes
in a sample of students who could not receive the scholarship. In general, the results presented in
this section do not harm the credibility of our primary findings.
Including non-FAFSA filers to increase power. As mentioned earlier, the large
standard errors present in Tables 4 through 6 indicate substantial noise in our models. This is
partially a function of our analytical strategy: by focusing on a subset of LAU students within a
small pre-ACS GPA range, we are significantly limiting the power of our study. In addition, it
may be the case that college outcomes measures are relatively noisy for students with low
academic credentials. Given these issues, it would be reasonable to assume that the null findings
largely presented in Tables 4 through 6 are the result of low statistical power rather than a true
equivalence of outcomes.
Fortunately, we can increase our model power by relaxing some of the requirements for
inclusion in our analytical sample. For example, the analytical sample has until now excluded
non-FAFSA filers in order to strictly adhere to the ACS qualifications for Current Achievers.
Instead, we can expand the analytical sample—while not strongly adjusting the primary
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estimates—by including in-state students who did not complete a FAFSA using the following
model:
3. 𝑅𝑖 = 𝑎 + ℎ𝐹𝑖 + 𝑏𝐹𝑖 𝑥𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑦𝑖 + 𝑓(𝐹𝑖 𝑥𝑐𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑖 )′𝑐 + 𝑓(𝐹𝑖 𝑥𝑐𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑖 𝑥𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑦𝑖 )′ 𝑑 + 𝑋𝑖 ′𝑔 + 𝑒𝑖
4. 𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝜏𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽𝐹𝑖 𝑥𝑅̂𝑖 + 𝑓(𝐹𝑖 𝑥𝑐𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑖 )′ 𝛿1 + 𝑓(𝐹𝑖 𝑥𝑐𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑖 𝑥𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑦𝑖 )′ 𝛿2 + 𝑋𝑖 ′𝛾 + 𝜖𝑖
where equation (3) represents a first stage regression for the model outlined in equation (4) and F
indicates if an individual has completed a FAFSA. The models presented in equations (3) and (4)
differ from our primary models only in that they include the FAFSA indicator along with its
interaction with the treatment and assignment variables of interest to our RDD. The coefficient
on FAFSA gives the difference between FAFSA non-recipients and FAFSA non-filers. The
coefficient on the interaction expresses the difference of interest: the estimated difference
between qualified ACS applicants who are predicted to receive an ACS scholarship and eligible
applicants who are not predicted to receive the scholarship. Given the model specification, we
should expect the estimates to strongly mirror those presented in Tables 4 through 6 while the
overall precision of the model will be improved.
Tables 7a and 7b present analyses based on the model outlined in equations 3 and 4. Two
models are presented for each outcome: a simple model and a model that includes demographic
controls.68 As expected, the estimated coefficients on the interactions largely mirror those
presented in Tables 4 through 6. Furthermore, the estimated relationships for the baseline
characteristics are similar. Interestingly, despite the increase in model precision—as noted by the

68

Our data limits us to only knowing family income via the FAFSA application. We cannot
include controls for family income because they are perfectly collinear with FAFSA. Thus, while
the model precision is improved in tables 7a and 7b, we caution the reader to take the results
presented in tables 4 through 6 as our primary results.
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Table 7a
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RD Effect Estimates for Short- and Medium-run Outcomes, including Non-FAFSA Filers
Year 1 GPA
Pr(Persist 1 Year)
Year 1 Credit Acc.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
FAFSA & ACS
0.13
0.15
0.04
0.09
-7.12
-4.65
Interaction
(0.11)
(0.11)
(0.28)
(0.26)
(13.96)
(12.19)
-0.11** -0.10**
-0.02
-0.03
-0.39
-0.60
FAFSA Filer
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.07)
(0.07)
(3.77)
(3.55)
-0.04***
0.00
-0.71
Male
(0.01)
(0.04)
(0.72)
-0.06
-0.65***
1.35
Black
(0.06)
(0.23)
(3.75)
0.06
-0.67***
-0.56
Hispanic
(0.11)
(0.19)
(2.21)
-0.06
0.63***
-1.36
Other race
(0.06)
(0.20)
(2.82)
-0.00
0.00
1.05
Parent attended college
(0.04)
(0.03)
(0.95)
N
489
488
489
488
480
479
ACS GPA Band
.30
.30
.30
.30
.30
.30

Year 2 Credit Acc.
(7)
(8)
-10.68
-9.12
(13.06) (13.26)
2.38
2.49
(2.96)
(3.39)
-0.44
(0.71)
3.94
(4.43)
2.37
(4.30)
-3.45
(3.69)
1.37
(1.28)
373
373
.30
.30

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering of individuals in major. All models include controls for entering cohort year, pre-ACS hours below 15
hours, and quadratic functions of the assignment variable, centered pre-ACS GPA.
Source. Authors’ calculations.

Table 7b
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RD Effect Estimates for Short- and Medium-run Outcomes, including Non-FAFSA Filers
Final GPA
Pr(Graduate in 4 Years)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
-0.33**
-0.26***
-0.66***
-0.62***
FAFSA & ACS Interaction
(0.14)
(0.09)
(0.07)
(0.07)
-0.01
0.02
0.11***
0.11***
FAFSA Filer
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.04)
-0.04**
-0.03
Male
(0.02)
(0.05)
-0.02
0.17***
Black
(0.08)
(0.06)
0.15
-0.06
Hispanic
(0.12)
(0.13)
-0.13
-0.13***
Other race
(0.09)
(0.03)
0.07*
0.07
Parent attended college
(0.04)
(0.05)
N
484
483
489
488
ACS GPA Band
.30
.30
.30
.30

Pr(Graduate in 5 Years)
(5)
(6)
0.17
0.24
(0.41)
(0.27)
-0.11
-0.10
(0.17)
(0.14)
0.10*
(0.05)
-0.24**
(0.11)
-0.31
(0.21)
0.19
(0.13)
-0.03
(0.08)
240
239
.30
.30

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering of individuals in major. All models include controls for entering cohort year, pre-ACS hours below 15
hours, and quadratic functions of the assignment variable, centered pre-ACS GPA.
Source. Authors’ calculations.

smaller observed standard errors in Tables 7a and 7b—the general relationships remain: ACS
receipt is associated with insignificant differences in the short-run; but significant negative
relationships between final GPA and likelihood of graduation. Nevertheless, the differences
again dissipate after 5 years.
Thus, despite the increased statistical power of the analyses presented in Table 7a and 7b,
the general story remains the same: ACS receipt is associated with insignificant differences on
short-run outcomes, negative results for final GPA and likelihood of graduating within four
years, and yet an insignificant difference in the likelihood of graduating within five years.
Varying band widths. Table 8 presents results from models examining the relationship
between ACS receipt and our seven college outcomes using varying pre-ACS GPA bandwidths.
All models are fully specified, employing demographic and financial history controls. Columns
1, 4, and 7 reproduce the results for our analyses using our preferred 0.30 bandwidth. Columns 2,
5, and 8 present results for a larger bandwidth of 0.40 (GPA ranging from 2.1 to 2.9 points).
Columns 3, 6, and 9 present results for a smaller bandwidth of 0.20 (GPA ranging from 2.3 to
2.7 points). Unfortunately, we were unable to achieve convergence for our probit models
estimating ACS effects for year 1 persistence for pre-ACS GPA bands of .40 and .20. Instead, we
present results from Linear Probability Models (LPM), which effectively treat the dichotomous
persistence variable as a continuous variable.69 While LPM estimation is not the preferred
method70, it is the best means available to estimate these relationships.

69

This assumption leads both to heteroskedasticity in the model (Angrist & Pischke, 2009) and
bias in estimated effects (Wooldridge, 2002).
70
Roughly 17 percent of observations in the .40 GPA band LPM estimate have predicted
probabilities falling outside the plausible range of 0 and 1. The corresponding percentage in the
.20 GPA band model is 22 percent.
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Table 8
RD Effect Estimated with Varying Band Widths
(1)
(2)
(3)
Year 1 GPA
Predicted ACS
0.13
0.08
0.00
Receipt
(0.11)
(0.18)
(0.17)
N
ACS GPA Band

Predicted ACS
Receipt
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N
ACS GPA Band

321
0.30

451
0.40

205
0.20

Year 1 Credit Acc.
-4.72
-7.04
-7.74
(13.69)
(11.48)
(15.38)
321
0.30

451
0.40

205
0.20

Predicted ACS
Receipt

-0.26*
-0.13

Final GPA
-0.25*
-0.13

-0.38
-0.24

N
ACS GPA Band

241
0.30

345
0.40

146
0.20

(4)

(5)
(6)
Pr(Persist 1 Year)ǂ
0.05
0.05
-0.15
(0.20)
(0.28)
(0.35)
321
0.30

451
0.40

(7)

(8)

(9)

205
0.20

Year 2 Credit Acc.
-8.38
-10.15
-11.23
(15.61)
(12.36)
(14.28)
251
.30

358
.40

160
.20

Pr(Graduate in 4 years)
-0.53*** -0.48*** -0.53***
(0.07)
(0.08)
(0.05)
321
0.30

451
0.40

205
0.20

Pr(Graduate in 5 years)
0.08
-0.05
-.01
(0.30)
(0.23)
(0.41)
158
0.30

221
0.40

101
0.20

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ǂ Effects on persistence are estimated using linear probability models for .40 and .20 ACS GPA Bands due to a failure to achieve convergence in probit models.
Note. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering of individuals in major. All models are fully specified: they include controls for student demographics,
family finance, entering cohort year, pre-ACS hours below 15 hours, and quadratic functions of the assignment variable, centered pre-ACS GPA.
Source. Authors’ calculations.

In general, the effect estimates presented in Table 8 are not particularly sensitive to band
width: ACS receipt is insignificantly related to year 1 GPA, credit hour accumulation, and the
likelihood of graduating within five years. Similarly, ACS is strongly and negatively related to
both final GPA and the likelihood of gradating in four years. In addition, the coefficient
estimates are fairly similar across models in Table 8. The consistency of these findings is
promising for our analysis.
Differential effects among prior ACS recipients. Currently, prior ACS recipients—or
students who received an ACS in at least one semester after initial matriculation prior to the
expansion of the program in the fall of 2010—constitute nearly 40 percent of our analytical
sample. The models presented in Tables 4 through 6 account for differences in college outcomes
experienced among this group using a simple dummy variable; effectively assuming that the
ACS expansion treatment effects on college outcomes are experienced similarly among old and
new ACS recipients.71 If, instead, prior ACS recipients differ from new ACS recipients, our
primary results could suffer from bias due to misspecification. For example, the insignificant
results observed in Tables 4 through 6 could be explained by prior ACS recipients having
already experienced the benefits of the program, thereby effectively masking any positive results
experienced by new recipients. It is important to examine the extent to which prior ACS
recipients are driving our overall estimates because they constitute such a large portion of the
analytical sample.

71

At the same time, the qualification and receipt rates are actually fairly similar between the two
groups. Specifically, 74 percent of students who did not receive an ACS in the past qualified in
the fall of 2010 compared to 66 percent of prior ACS recipients. Of these, 51 percent of students
who did not receive the ACS in the past received the scholarship in the fall of 2010 compared to
61 percent of prior ACS recipients.
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Table 9
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Comparing Prior ACS Recipients with New ACS Recipients
(1)
(2)
Year 1 GPA
Predicted ACS Receipt
0.12
0.13
(0.11)
(0.10)
ACS Receipt & Prior ACS Interaction
0.05
0.01
(0.11)
(0.13)
Prior ACS Recipient
-0.02
0.01
(0.04)
(0.05)
Controls for demographics and income
X
N
322
321

(3)
(4)
Pr(Persist 1 Yr.) ǂ
0.02
0.07
(0.37)
(0.31)
-0.10
-0.10
(0.09)
(0.08)
0.06*
0.07***
(0.04)
(0.02)
X
322
321

(5)
(6)
Year 1 Credit Acc.
-6.80
-4.75
(14.38) (13.67)
1.04
0.62
(2.37)
(1.82)
0.02
0.76
(0.98)
(1.79)
X
322
321

Final GPA
Predicted ACS Receipt
-0.32** -0.26**
(0.15)
(0.13)
ACS Receipt & Prior ACS Interaction
0.14
0.06
(0.21)
(0.23)
Prior ACS Recipient
-0.06
0.02
(0.07)
(0.11)
Controls for demographics and income
X
N
322
321

Pr(Grad. in 4 Yrs.) ǂ
-1.11*** -0.93***
(0.38)
(0.29)
0.29**
0.30
(0.15)
(0.25)
-0.11
-0.04
(0.08)
(0.11)
X
322
321

Pr(Grad. in 5 Yrs.) ǂ
0.02
-0.14
(0.49)
(0.48)
0.99*** 0.97***
(0.33)
(0.31)
-0.31*** -0.21***
(0.07)
(0.07)
X
159
158

(7)
(8)
Year 2 Credit Acc.
-8.97
-7.08
(12.34) (12.50)
7.23*
6.49*
(4.39)
(3.70)
-2.26
-1.43
(1.56)
(2.28)
X
251
251

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ǂ Effects on persistence are estimated using linear probability models for .40 and .20 ACS GPA Bands due to a failure to achieve convergence in probit models.
Note. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering of individuals in major. All models include controls for entering cohort year, pre-ACS hours below 15
hours, and quadratic functions of the assignment variable, centered pre-ACS GPA. All models with discrete dependent variables are estimated using linear
probability regression models due to a failure to achieve convergence in binary probit models.
Source. Authors’ calculations.

Table 9 presents results from analyses exploring the extent to which prior ACS recipients
experience different treatment effects than new ACS recipients.72 Specifically, the estimates in
the first row of Table 9 describe the estimated difference between ACS recipients and nonrecipients who have not won an ACS in the past. The second row, titled “ACS Receipt & Prior
ACS Interaction” presents the estimated ACS treatment different between new and prior ACS
recipients. Finally, the coefficient estimates in row three represent the differences in outcomes
between students who received the ACS in the past and those who did not among non-ACS
recipients.
The results presented in Table 9 provide some assurance that our primary estimates are
not strongly confounded by the presence of prior-ACS recipients. First, the coefficients on the
majority of interaction terms are insignificant: indicating that new- and prior-ACS recipients did
not experience dramatically different outcomes following the expansion of the program in the
fall of 2010. The exceptions are the models examining credit accumulation after two years and
the two models estimating the ACS effects on the likelihood of graduation. The significant
interactions in the latter models are less concerning because the coefficient estimates are based
on linear probability regressions, which tend to be biased when continuous covariates are
included in the model (Wooldridge, 2002). 73 At the same time, LPM estimation is the best
available analytical option in these cases, as our probit estimations failed to achieve
convergence. The significant interactions in the year two credit accumulation models are more
concerning. Moreover, while insignificant, new ACS receivers earned fewer credit hours than

72

As with the analyses presented in the prior section, all models examining discrete dependent
variables are estimated using linear probability models.
73
Indeed, over between 24 and 33 percent of observations in the models estimating the
likelihood of graduation within 4 years have predicted probabilities of graduating outside the
plausible range of 0 or 1. Similarly, around 15 percent of observations are outside this range for
the LPMs estimating the likelihood of graduating within 5 years.
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students who did not qualify for the ACS and did not receive it in the past. This finding is
concerning for the models focusing on credit hour accumulation after two years, and we
therefore recommend caution in interpreting these results.
In addition, none of the estimated differences between prior and new ACS recipients (row
3) are largely statistically significant, further highlighting the similarity of the two groups. Again,
the exceptions to this are largely associated with linear probability regressions, which are not
generally the preferred method for estimating effects with binary dependent variables. These
models indicate that, among students who did not receive the ACS in fall 2010, former ACS
recipients were slightly more likely to persist through the spring of 2011 and were less likely to
graduate within five years.
Finally, the results presented in Table 9 confirm the earlier finding that students who are
predicted to receive the ACS have significantly lower final GPAs than other students. Given the
relatively small differences in estimated effects between Table 9 and Tables 4 through 6, as well
as the substantively small differences estimated by the interaction effects, we conclude that our
overall effects are not strongly biased by prior ACS recipients.
Cohort interactions. As noted earlier, our primary analyses are based on an uneven
panel. Currently, our data do not allow us to estimate 5-year graduation for all cohorts because
the 2009-10 cohort—who were sophomores when they could win the scholarship—could at most
be enrolled in their fifth year at the conclusion of our data. Given the strong negative four year
graduation rate results and the insignificant five year graduation results; there is a concern that
the effects of the ACS on college outcomes may vary by cohort. In Table 10 we present results
.
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Table 10
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RD Effect Estimates Separated by Cohorts
(1)
(2)
Year 1 GPA
0.18
0.16
ACS Recipient in '07 Cohort
(0.20)
(0.20)
0.42***
0.26*
ACS Recipient in '08 Cohort
(0.16)
(0.13)
0.03
0.01
ACS Recipient in '09 Cohort
(0.08)
(0.04)
-0.00
0.00
Cohort 2007
(0.03)
(0.03)
-0.16***
-0.10**
Cohort 2008
(0.05)
(0.05)
Controls for demo. and income
X
N
322
321
Year 2 Credit Acc.
ACS Recipient in '07 Cohort
ACS Recipient in '08 Cohort
ACS Recipient in '09 Cohort

-6.31
(15.06)
-8.57
(12.99)

-8.16
(17.41)
-8.45
(15.26)

-0.54
(2.00)

0.32
(2.07)
X
251

Cohort 2007
Cohort 2008
Controls for demo. and income
N

251

(3)
(4)
Pr(Persist 1 Yr.)
0.00
0.03
(0.36)
(0.29)
-0.09
-0.03
(0.37)
(0.30)
0.07
0.17
(0.35)
(0.27)
0.06
0.09**
(0.05)
(0.04)
0.12*
0.14**
(0.07)
(0.06)
X
322
321
Final GPA
-0.25
-0.23
(0.16)
(0.19)
-0.12
-0.22**
(0.09)
(0.10)
-0.41**
-0.32**
(0.17)
(0.13)
-0.10***
-0.06
(0.04)
(0.04)
-0.14**
-0.06
(0.07)
(0.06)
X
322
321

(5)
(6)
Year 1 Credit Acc.
-7.96
-6.77
(12.75)
(12.55)
-3.72
-3.32
(16.84)
(16.05)
-4.69
-2.00
(14.93)
(13.46)
3.31
4.03
(3.11)
(3.15)
1.62
2.59
(2.46)
(2.65)
X
322
321
Pr(Grad. in 4 Yrs.)
-1.08***
-0.95***
(0.34)
(0.23)
-0.97***
-0.87***
(0.34)
(0.26)
-1.10**
-0.90*
(0.50)
(0.54)
0.03
0.07
(0.18)
(0.23)
-0.04
0.01
(0.14)
(0.16)
X
322
321

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering of individuals in major. All models include controls for entering cohort year, pre-ACS hours below 15
hours, and quadratic functions of the assignment variable, centered pre-ACS GPA. Persistence and Graduation models are estimated using LPM regressions.
Source. Authors’ calculations.

from models exploring the possibility of differential treatment effects across cohorts through a
series of interactions.
Specifically, we split out the receipt variable across the three cohorts. The coefficient
estimates associated with the rows titled “Cohort 2007” and “Cohort 2008” represent the
estimated difference between in outcomes between non-ACS recipients in the given cohorts and
the 2009 cohort. The coefficient estimates on the interactions presented in rows one through
three represent the estimated treatment differential for each cohort. As before, we are only able
to present results of linear probability models for our binary outcome models due to a failure to
achieve convergence in probit models
For the most part, the results presented in Table 10 do not suggest that ACS treatment
effects differed largely across cohorts. At the individual coefficient level, there is evidence that
some relationships are driven more strongly by particular cohorts. For example, the 2008-09
cohort may be driving the results for Year 1 GPA while the 2007-08 cohort appears to contribute
little to the results observed for Final GPA. Nevertheless, it is important to note the great degree
of noise present in Table 10, which is symptomatic of the small sizes of the analytical samples.
Indeed, while some cohort-specific treatment coefficients are statistically significant, t-tests
examining the extent to which all three coefficient estimates are the same fail to reject the null
hypothesis across all models. Thus, in general, while the evidence presented in Table 10 suggests
that certain cohorts may be driving our results, we are unable to support this claim with statistical
tests due to power limitations.
Placebo analysis. As a final check of our analytical strategy, we estimate ACS effects in
a cohort of students who could not receive the lottery scholarship financed ACS. Specifically, we
examine a “placebo” sample of students who matriculated at LAU in cohort years 2004-05,

126

2005-06, and 2006-07. All students included in our analyses meet the same requirements of our
analytical sample: they are in-state applicants who have filled out a FAFSA, have been
continuously enrolled, meet the ACS credit hours requirement, and have cumulative GPAs
between 2.2 and 2.8 points. In addition, we restrict the cohorts to mirror their counterparts in our
analytical sample: the 2004-05 cohort is examined in their 7th semester, 2005-06 cohort is
examined in their 5th semester, and the 2006-07 cohort is examined in its 3rd semester.
The results of our placebo analysis are presented in Table 11. Because we do not have
data on scholarship receipt, all models estimate the intent-to-treat effect of ACS qualification. In
addition, all models are fully specified. As expected, ACS qualification is not significantly
related to any of the seven college outcomes. More importantly, all estimated effects are
substantively small; providing strong evidence that ACS qualification was not related to
outcomes in these earlier cohorts. While not definitive, these findings again lend credence to our
analysis
Discussion
In this paper, we examine the effect of the Arkansas Academic Challenge Scholarship—a broadbased state-financed merit-aid scholarship—on college outcomes at a Large Arkansas University
(LAU) by using scholarship eligibility requirements in a regression discontinuity framework. In
general, our results indicate that currently enrolled LAU students who received the ACS did not
earn higher cumulative GPAs and were no more likely to be enrolled after one year. On the other
hand, ACS recipients had significantly lower final GPAs and were significantly less likely to
graduate within four years. Nevertheless, our models indicate that ACS recipients were no less
likely to graduate within five years than comparison group students. Taken along with the
negative—but statistically insignificant—findings on credit hours, our results may suggest that
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Table 11
RD Effect Estimates for Students Entering LAU in 2004-05, 2005-06, and 2006-07
(1)
(2)
Year 1 GPA
Pr(Persist 1 Year)
0.06
0.16
Predicted ACS Receipt
(0.05)
(1.46)
N
ACS GPA Band

Predicted ACS Receipt
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N
ACS GPA Band

(3)
Year 1 Credit Acc.
-0.03
(0.12)

(4)
Year 2 Credit Acc.
0.40
(2.39)
217
.30

266
.30

255
.30

233
.30

Final GPA
0.08
(0.05)

Pr(Graduate in 4 years)
-0.03
(0.12)

Pr(Graduate in 5 years)
0.12
(0.27)

258
.30

260
.30

103
.30

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering of individuals in major. All models are fully specified: they include controls for student demographics,
family finance, entering cohort year, pre-ACS hours below 15 hours, and quadratic functions of the assignment variable, centered pre-ACS GPA. To mirror the
samples available for our primary analyses, the “Year 2 Credit Acc.” model (row 1; column 4) excludes the 2004-05 cohort and the “Pr(Graduated in 5 years)”
(row 2; column 3) model excludes the 2006-07 cohort.
Source. Authors’ calculations.

ACS recipients were more likely to delay graduation.
These findings differ from earlier RDD analyses of state-financed merit-aid programs.
For example, Scott-Clayton finds in her 2012 examination of the West Virginia PROMISE
scholarship that recipients earned significantly higher final GPAs, accumulated significantly
more credit hours, and were significantly more likely to graduate within four years. While we
would like to stress that the findings presented in this paper are preliminary, we offer two
comments regarding our divergent findings.
First, we are examining a substantively different student population compared to prior
studies. Specifically, our study is focused on students who were currently enrolled in college
when they became eligible for the ACS (as opposed to entering freshmen) meeting relatively
weak academic credential requirements (enrolling for 12 hours a semester and earning a
cumulative GPA of at least 2.5 points). While West Virginia’s PROMISE program is similar to
the Arkansas ACS, it should not be unexpected to find that these different student populations
would have different experiences.
Second, while our results differ from other studies, it is important to note that they
present a consistent story. Specifically, the statistically insignificant negative credit hour
accumulation findings and evidence suggesting that ACS recipients are just as likely as nonrecipients to graduate within five years are consistent with students delaying their time to
graduation after receiving a scholarship. While this may not be the intended impact of the ACS,
it nevertheless helps to explain why our findings differ from other studies.
Finally, we would like to highlight the preliminary nature of the research presented in this
paper. For example, our current analysis does not yet employ a sophisticated procedure for

128

determining band width nor are all models complete. We intend to address these issues in future
versions of this research.
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Appendix
Table A1
Remaining Estimated Coefficients for Second Stage Regressions, Simple and Full Models Only
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Year 1 GPA
Pr(Persist 1 Year)
Cohort 2007-08
0.06
0.07
0.02
0.03
(0.05)
(0.07)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Cohort 2008-09
0.00
0.00
0.06***
0.06**
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.03)
Pre-ACS hours <15
-0.01
0.01
-0.04
-0.03
(0.04)
(0.03)
(0.08)
(0.06)
cGPA
0.44
0.39
0.01
0.10
(0.58)
(0.80)
(0.36)
(0.19)
cGPA^2
-1.82
-1.70
1.32
1.82*
(2.48)
(3.16)
(1.39)
(1.04)
Qualify x cGPA
-0.07
-0.22
0.36
0.19
(1.29)
(1.52)
(1.00)
(0.69)
Qualify x cGPA^2
2.62
3.27*
-1.83
-2.30
(1.59)
(1.80)
(2.44)
(2.01)
Observations
322
321
322
321
One Year Credit Accumulation
Two Year Credit Accumulation
Cohort 2007-08
1.85
1.91
----(1.99)
(2.42)
----Cohort 2008-09
1.92***
1.94***
0.39
0.44
(0.49)
(0.62)
(1.08)
(1.38)
Pre-ACS hours <15
-3.54
-2.91
-2.28
-1.56
(2.94)
(2.45)
(1.68)
(1.45)
cGPA
-11.38
-12.75
0.49
5.98
(27.69)
(25.71)
(21.20)
(19.76)
cGPA^2
-75.49
-72.84
-63.16
-40.53
(93.32)
(85.25)
(79.35)
(61.26)
Qualify x cGPA
40.80
36.63
21.42
14.97
(32.98)
(28.52)
(47.28)
(48.93)
Qualify x cGPA^2
28.94
38.24
57.02
37.25
(150.05)
(144.98)
(123.00)
(151.74)
Observations
322
321
251
251
Student demographics
X
X
Family income
X
X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering of individuals in major. Estimated coefficients correspond
with the results presented in Tables 4 and 5. All models are restricted to samples within the pre-ACS GPA band of
.30. The 2007-08 cohort is excluded from the two year credit accumulation models because this members of this
cohort are expected to be in their fourth year of college when they could receive the expanded ACS; and are
therefore less likely to be enrolled two years after potential receipt.
Source. Authors’ calculations.
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Table A2.
Remaining Estimated Coefficients for Second Stage Regressions, Simple and Full Models Only
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Final GPA
Pr(Graduate in 4 years)
Cohort 2007-08
-0.03
-0.02
0.01
0.02
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.06)
Cohort 2008-09
-0.02
-0.02
0.01
0.01
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.03)
(0.02)
Pre-ACS Hours <15
-0.08*
-0.05
-0.15***
-0.14***
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.03)
(0.03)
cGPA
1.95***
1.78***
1.65***
1.77**
(0.74)
(0.64)
(0.48)
(0.75)
cGPA^2
3.06
2.82
4.51**
4.80
(3.29)
(2.75)
(1.90)
(3.07)
Qualify x cGPA
-0.75
-0.83
-0.08
-0.21
(1.67)
(1.50)
(0.93)
(1.03)
Qualify x cGPA^2
-3.36
-2.51
-6.98**
-7.39*
(3.64)
(2.51)
(2.81)
(4.28)
Observations
322
321
322
321
Pr(Graduate in 5 years)
Cohort 2007-08
0.08**
0.07
(0.04)
(0.05)
Pre-ACS Hours <15
-0.13
-0.17
(0.15)
(0.13)
cGPA
-2.47*
-0.84
(1.35)
(1.66)
cGPA^2
-13.37***
-7.55
(4.66)
(6.47)
Qualify x cGPA
1.48
-0.88
(2.01)
(0.72)
Qualify x cGPA^2
17.34**
13.42
(8.73)
(11.40)
Observations
159
158
Student demographics
X
X
Family income
X
X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering of individuals in major. Estimated coefficients correspond
with the results presented in Table 6. All models are restricted to samples within the pre-ACS GPA band of .30.
Source. Authors’ calculations.
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Conclusion
Cash transfers are an increasingly popular policy instrument both abroad and in the
United States. In this dissertation, I investigate how two statewide educational interventions
using conditional cash transfer programs affected student outcomes.
Chapter 1 presents the first experimental study of a statewide school voucher program in
the United States: the Louisiana Scholarship Program. Unlike similar random assignment
evaluations of school voucher programs, the effect estimates presented in Chapter 1 indicate that
students who used the LSP scholarships to enroll in private schools experienced significant
declines in both ELA and math achievement. These estimates are quite substantial and are robust
to several specification checks.
Chapter 2 also examines the experiences of students participating in the first year of the
LSP's statewide expansion. Unlike other school voucher evaluations, which have largely focused
on student achievement and attainment, Chapter 2 represents the first attempt to examine how
students participating in a voucher program differ on non-cognitive skills and political tolerance
measures from other applicants. In general, the results presented in Chapter 2 do not indicate that
the two groups differed strongly on these measures after two years. Furthermore, while
researchers attempting to estimate the effects of charter schools on Grit have cautioned against
the presence of reference group bias (Dobbie & Fryer, 2014; West et al., 2014), we find little
evidence of such bias in our estimates.
Finally, Chapter 3 investigates the effects of a broad-based aid scholarship in Arkansas,
the Academic Challenge Scholarship, on college outcomes for students who were currently
enrolled in college at the time of the program's expansion. The estimates presented in Chapter 3
indicate that students who barely qualified for the scholarship performed no differently than
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students who barely missed the ACS cutoffs after one year, but had significantly lower final
GPAs and four year graduation rates. Nevertheless, ACS recipients appear to have caught up to
their counterparts after five years; suggesting that students receiving the ACS may use the
additional funds to delay their graduation.
While Chapters 1 through 3 all include several robustness checks designed to examine
result sensitivity, it is important to consider the following caveats when interpreting these
findings. First, it is important to recognize that the results presented in Chapter 1 are based on a
subset of eligible LSP applicants who had baseline achievement and whose scholarship receipt
was determined by oversubscription lotteries. These restrictions effectively limit the analysis to
an analytical sample representing slightly less than 20 percent of eligible applicants. It is
therefore important to recognize that the estimated results may not be indicative of the
experiences of other students in the program. Furthermore, the estimates in Chapter 1 are based
on little more than 6 months of program participation. Future versions of this research will
explore if these negative effects persist as students and schools become acclimated to the
program.
While the estimated differences between LSP receivers and non-receivers are
insignificant in Chapter 2, they are also particularly noisy. This is likely due to two factors: the
scales used are validated neither for phone surveys nor for children as young as some of the
children included in our survey sample. In addition, it is important to note that the final analytical
sample examined in Chapter 2 represents only 10 percent of the population of eligible LSP
applicants in the first year of the program’s expansion. As is often the case with survey-based
research, the estimates presented in this chapter likely suffer from sample selection issues.
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Chapter 3 additionally suffers from statistical power concerns due to both the small
sample of students with academic qualifications around the ACS cutoffs as well as the general
power issues involved with fuzzy regression discontinuity estimations. In addition, the analysis
presented in Chapter 3 is currently limited by an inability to estimate program effects on five
year graduation rates for students in the 2009-10 cohort due to data limitations. Given the
substantially large negative effects estimated for four year graduation rates, it is possible that the
overall ACS effect may be negative when these students are included in the final analysis. This
question will be addressed in future research once we obtain an additional year of data.
Despite these caveats, the research presented in this dissertation makes several
contributions to the school choice and higher education financial aid literatures. Chapter 1
represents the first experimental evaluation of a statewide voucher program as well as the first
such study to estimate statistically significant achievement effects. Chapter 2 is the first attempt
by researchers to compare students participating in a school voucher program on non-cognitive
skills and measures of political tolerance. Finally, Chapter 3 represents the first attempt to
estimate the impact of a broad-based merit-aid scholarship with low academic qualifications on
college outcomes for students who were currently enrolled in college at the time of scholarship
receipt.
On the whole, however, the most important takeaway from this research is the possibility
of unintended, and potentially perverse, outcomes resulting from policy designs. The significant
negative achievement effect estimates presented in Chapter 1 represent the first of their kind
among random assignment evaluations of school voucher programs in the U.S. Moreover, the
magnitude of the estimated effects is highly concerning. Policymakers considering voucher
programs in other states should consider recent research suggesting that the program's regulatory
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framework creates disincentives for private school participation (Kisida, Wolf, & Rhinesmith,
2014). Similarly, the evidence presented in Chapter 3 suggesting that students currently enrolled
in college who received the ACS may have delayed graduation may be worrisome to
policymakers. In particular, this evidence suggests that similar programs should consider how
students currently enrolled in college, as well as students with particularly low academic
credentials, may be impacted by similar scholarship programs.
Thus, while each of the analyses presented in this dissertation benefit their respective
literatures due to the novelty of their subjects, this research is a reminder that unintended
consequences are likely to arise in any educational intervention. This suggests a continued need
for policymakers and researchers to work together in an effort to design, monitor, and re-design
programs for the benefit of all involved.
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